RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AS A TOOL OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Aneta Křičková

Abstract: The article offers an overview of the post-apartheid development in South Africa with a special focus on a policy promoted by the African National Congress (ANC) to mitigate socio-economic inequality within South African society. In this sense, the key strategy of the ANC was the economic platform, of which the goal was to achieve poverty reduction and the strengthening of the economy. For this purpose the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was adopted in 1994. The main aim of the article is the ANC’s strategy in the field of the RDP that can be considered the specific tool of socio-economic transformation because the RDP was essentially a basic-needs programme which focused on the provision of infrastructure, housing, free and compulsory schooling, electricity, running water and toilets, health care and land to the poor.

Keywords: African National Congress; socio-economic transformation; Reconstruction and Development Programme; land reform.

Introduction

After the fall of apartheid in 1994 all discriminatory laws, which racially disadvantaged the black population, were abolished.¹ There was a widespread belief that a new era would bring equality, where all ethnic groups would be able to live next to each other. Mandela’s

¹ In 1948 National Party won the elections and enacted some crucial laws in 1940’s and 1950’s, which meant the institutionalization of the race segregation regime. The entire classification process was legally imposed and ascribed, more specifically on the basis of the 1950 Population Registration Act, and often arbitrarily implemented (Harries 1989: 110). The act distinguished four major racial categories, namely white, black, coloured and Indian/Asian. The apartheid regime indeed did not limit its racial classifications to black and white but also further subdivided the overwhelming non-white majority in three sub-groups namely Africans, coloureds and Indians/Asians (Carrim 1996: 47, 50).
vision was one of racial equality and racial reconciliation. Here some rhetorical questions arise: Is it even possible to overcome the legacy of apartheid and begin to live up to the ‘non-racial’ ideal of South Africa? And is it possible to fulfil Nelson Mandela’s idea and demand for the co-existence of a ‘rainbow nation’? How does reality differ from the vision of a ‘non-colour’ society?

The important ANC’s strategy was also the economic platform that was adopted by the subsequent Government of National Unity. The name of the platform was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence each other. However, development without economic growth would be financially unsustainable and economic growth without development would not bring the coveted conversion of obsolete structures and the redistribution of property within South African society. For this reason, the RDP sought to combine economic growth (such as; through the tax system changes, efforts to reduce public debt and the liberalization of trade), with social programs for the poor.

The RDP quickly ran into problems. Therefore the government adopted a new Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in 1996. This strategy brought bigger financial discipline, but it failed in key regions. Instead of the creation of new job positions, unemployment rose and economic growth did not achieve the planned goal. The great expectations of the poor (black) South Africans could not be satisfied enough, because of the relatively slow economic growth. Other government economic priorities were attempts to integrate black South Africans into running the economy. From this initiative the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which e.g. supports the training of black employees and promotes them to management posts, was developed. The BEE’s plan was to transform the economy in such a way to demonstrate the demographic representation of the country.

Simeon and Murray have pointed out that the ANC leaders were acutely aware of the immense developmental tasks that would face a democratic, non-racial South Africa. Who could address the challenges of educating South Africans, and of providing them with housing, water, electricity, and health care? Who could engineer the redistribution
of wealth in one of the world’s most unequal societies (Simeon and Murray 2009: 9)?

The article will discuss a policy promoted by the ANC to mitigate socio-economic inequality since the end of apartheid in 1994. Taking the 1993 situation as the point of departure, it gives an account of the path leading to the formulation of the major policy documents. A special focus will be dedicated to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

The article did not include the issues such as HIV, poverty or electricity because of the limited framework. That is the reason why the article does not include in detail other areas that the RDP addresses. The article only provides a brief overview of the achievements and failures in these other areas. The article pays attention to one issue that is of land reform which is developed in detail.

The main reason why special attention is paid to land reform is that through the land reform the social and economic relations are meant to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the colonial class formation in South Africa that has combined capitalist development with national oppression. Land reform in South Africa is considered by many researchers as the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to the agricultural land can be seen as critical.

The main object of the article is to answer two research questions that are as follows: What principles is the RDP based on? What is the link between the RDP and the socio-economic transformation of South Africa? In the article the following methods are used: a content analysis of selected documents and a case study. The work will be processed as one-case study. The advantage of one-case study is a detailed analysis of a case and it obtains reliable information about the broader category of phenomenon. During the processing of the article the retrieval compilation method (collecting and assembling of the data and information relevant to the subject and their subsequent analysis and interpretation) is mainly used, and to a lesser extent also the analysis of statistical data. The article relies mainly on book publications and internet resources. During the processing of the
parts on the equalized programmes of economic, social and political differences between racial groups carried out by the black majority government, it is possible to rely on official government documents published on the website of the South African government, ministries and the parliament. Other valuable sources of information are annual reports of governmental programmes and documents from the United Nations and the World Bank. Finally, it must be mentioned the publications published on the website of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Other sources of information and data are various periodicals, such as the *Journal of Political Science* and articles freely available on the internet, that are devoted to the topic of post-apartheid development in South Africa.

From the main object of the article is thus possible to create an internal structure of the article which is divided into two main parts. The first part is devoted to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and its goals. The following part deals with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as the basis of socio-economic transformation. Therefore, attention is paid to the Land reform and its implementation. The conclusion tries to summarize the main information and to answer the research questions.

1. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

The year 1994 marked a historical political turning point in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) won the elections. The ANC did not have much of an economic programme when it was legalized. According to Lundahl and Petersson it was obvious that South Africa had two main economic problems to solve at the beginning of the 1990s: increasing the growth rate and improving the distribution of income, wealth and social services. A document called *Making Democracy Work* (MERG 1993) produced during a conference held by a network of macroeconomists loosely connected with the ANC together with political representatives of the latter. The document was incoherent but in the end it served as one of several inputs in what would become the first post-apartheid economic strategy in South Africa (Lundahl, Petersson 2009: 3).

The strategy that finally emerged was orchestrated by the ANC, it served as the economic platform of the party during the 1994 elections.
The name of the platform was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It was essentially a basic-needs programme which focused on the provision of infrastructure, housing, free and compulsory schooling, electricity, running water and toilets, health care and allocating land to the poor.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was adopted in 1994 after several months of discussions and negotiations between the ANC, South African Communist Party and the influential South African Congress of Trade Unions. According to Mandela the RDP would be “an all-encompassing process of transforming society in its totality to ensure a better life for all” (Dowden 2008: 395). The RDP supporters argue that the program was able to help in the most deprived social areas.

The RDP was to be financed out of the regular budget revenue. It aimed for a growth rate of up to 5 per cent at the turn of the millennium and the creation of some 300,000 new jobs every year, through trade liberalization, increased competition, support of small and medium-sized business establishments, education and technological change (Lundahl, Petersson 2009: 4).

The ANC\(^2\) government tried to create a political framework that would successfully wrestle with the structural and economic crisis inherited from the apartheid regime. In 1994, Parliament introduced the “RDP White Paper”, which identified the economic, social, legal, moral, cultural and environmental problems of the country.

The RDP’s aim was to reduce the problems caused by socioeconomic consequences of the apartheid regime, in particular poverty alleviation and improving access to social services. Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence by each other. But

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\(^2\) The ANC was formed at a time when South Africa was changing very fast. Diamonds had been discovered in 1867 and gold in 1886. Mine bosses wanted large numbers of people to work for them in the mines. Laws and taxes were designed to force people to leave their land. The most severe law was the 1913 land Act, which prevented Africans from buying, renting or using land, except in the reserves. Many communities or families immediately lost their land because of the Land Act. For millions of other black people it became very difficult to live off the land. The Land Act caused overcrowding, land hunger, poverty and starvation (African National Congress 2014).
development without economic growth would be financially unsustain-
able and economic growth without development would not bring
the coveted conversion of outdated structures and redistribution of
property within South African society. For this reason, the RDP sought
to combine economic growth (through tax system changes, efforts
to reduce public debt and liberalize trade), with social programs for
the poor.

The program is based on six core principles, which are linked together
and they should provide a compact implementation of the programme.
The RDP is “an integrated programme, based on the people, that
provides peace and security for all and builds the nation, links re-
construction and development and deepens democracy - these are the
six basic principles of the RDP” (RDP White Paper 1994):

**An integrated and sustainable programme:** The RDP brings together
strategies to harness all resources in a coherent and purposeful effort
that can be sustained into the future. These strategies will be imple-
mented at national, provincial and local levels by the government in
collaboration with civil society, non-governmental organizations, and
economic entities working within the framework of the RDP.

**A people-driven process:** Very important is the participation of citi-
zens, regardless of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban,
rich or poor. For that reason the government demanded the active
involvement and the increase of empowerment. The citizens should
also be involved in forums, peace structures and negotiations so that
they are included in the process.

**Peace and security for all:** The next principle promotes peace and
security that involve all people and must be built on and expand by
the National Peace Initiative. At the beginning of the reconstruction
process and development, security forces must be established. These
forces would reflect the national and gender character of the country
and must be non-partisan, professional, and uphold the Constitution
and respect human rights. This will have a positive impact on attract-
ing foreign investors and economic development.

**Nation-building:** The commitment of all political parties to support
the RDP will stimulate the task of building a new nation, where nation-
building is the basis on which to build and it can support the develop-
ment of the Southern African region. The RDP develops economic, political and social viability that can ensure national sovereignty.

**Link reconstruction and development:** The RDP is based on reconstruction and development being parts of an integrated process. Growth - the measurable increase in the output of the modern industrial economy - is commonly seen as apriority that must precede development. Development is portrayed as a marginal effort of redistribution to areas of urban and rural poverty. In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The RDP breaks decisively with this approach. The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education and training for all citizens. This will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the economy, and by modernising the infrastructure and human resource development.

**Democratisation of South Africa:** The success of the previous five principles will facilitate the introduction of the sixth - democratisation. Minority control and privilege are the main obstruction to developing an integrated programme that unleashes all the resources of the country. Democratisation must begin to transform both the state and civil society. Democracy is not confined to periodic elections. It is, rather, an active process enabling everyone to contribute to reconstruction and development.

The principles are linked to the strategies that show the way how to achieve their successful fulfilment: meeting basic needs; developing our human resources; building the economy; democratising the state and society. These five strategies or policy programmes are mutually connected and mark the process in which the last and the most important step is to implement the RDP. The next condition is the creation and active involvement of democratic structures (RDP 1994).
Figure 1: The principles and the key program of the RDP

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<tr>
<th>The principles</th>
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<td>Nation-building</td>
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Source: Created by author; based on information gained from the RDP 1994.

2. The RDP as a tool of socio-economic transformation

With the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa’s new democracy faced a principal challenge: dramatically increasing the government’s role in the provision of social services to its citizens in a way that would not compromise macro-economic stability. According to Coulibaly and Logan, by most measures, post-apartheid policymakers were successful in maintaining macroeconomic stability, but progress on meeting the social demands has been slower. The discontent with the slow pace of social progress gave rise to a new tone in public policy spearheaded by Jacob Zuma (standing president of South Africa since 2009) who has signalled that South Africa may tilt its policy priorities toward social spending programs in the coming years (Coulibaly, Logan 2009: 2).

Economic and social well-being addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an
inclusive and sustainable development program. Often accompanying the establishment of security, well-being entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the elements. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development (Hamre, Sullivan 2002: 91–92).

Economic recovery depends on the success of the transition and on the rebuilding of the domestic economy and the restoration of access to external resources (World Bank 1998: 4–5).

As stated in the RDP, “economic transformation and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth” (RDP 1994). The goal of economic transformation\(^3\) is: to address the scope of economic needs through job creation; to alleviate and to eradicate chronic poverty; to address economic inequalities and structural problems in, inter alia, industry and trade, mining, the agricultural, financial and labour markets; integration into the international economy; the phasing out of any discriminatory employment, training and promotion practices in the economy; the development of human abilities as a production factor in the economy; the democratization of the economy; and the development of a growing and balanced regional economy (RDP 1994).

Supporters of the RDP argue that the program was helpful in the most pressing economic and social areas. Lodge reported that there were many critics, who reacted to published official statistics negatively, arguing that the reality is a little different than the government claims. The criticism concerned primarily the quality of homes and water supply, health care and agricultural reform, and the unequal participation of men and women in projects (Lodge 2002: 56).

The balance between economic stability and social demands has been a constant policy dilemma for post-apartheid policy makers. The eco-

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\(^3\) The foundations and tools for transformation processes may be found within the systems themselves where the parties are subject to change. Therefore, solutions are sustainable only when they are generated by the parties to the conflict themselves (Wils et al. 2006: 4). According to Ropers “the causes and effects in social systems are connected in a rather complex way and can be separated substantially by distance and time” (Ropers 2008: 3).
nomic stability objectives have generally been achieved, but progress on social demand has been slow and below the expectations of South Africans. Social demand indicators for South Africa are generally below those of its economic peers. The slow progress to eradicate the social needs has tilted the balance of power in public policy in favour of Jacob Zuma, portrayed as a populist who will increase spending on public works and social demands, and undermine economic stability. As Zuma assumes power, the main question looming over his mandate would be whether and how he will shift the balance of these two policy objectives.

The status of existing property rights (including agricultural land) was a central factor in the negotiations that led to the political transition. White farmers and industrialists successfully lobbied to ensure that commitments to transformation in the 1993 interim constitution and the final 1996 constitution were tempered by a ‘property clause’ that recognised and protected existing property rights. The interaction of a number of factors ensured that a programme of land reform was adopted. Among these were mobilised rural communities, drawing on the militancy of their resistance to forced removals – and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civics and church groups that supported them – who demanded that their land be returned to them. Land reform performs an important symbolic function in South Africa as tangible evidence of a nation addressing a historical injustice as part of a wider process of nation-building. It also has the potential to form the centrepiece of a programme of rural restructuring: to transform social and economic relations and provide a structural basis for broad-based pro-poor development.

2.1 Land reform

Through land reform the social and economic relations are to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the colonial class formation in South Africa that has combined capitalist development with national oppression. Land reform in South Africa is considered by many researchers as the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of

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4 For major indicators that show increasing frustration regarding the slow pace of socio-economic transformations, see Table 1.
the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to the agricultural land might be seen as critical. Therefore, the land reform can be perceived as the way in which past racial exclusions and inequalities are being addressed.

In the 20th century, many countries attempted to initiate state-controlled land reform. According to Deininger, the governments in post-colonial countries were due to the implementation of land reforms under pressure, because they had to take control over fertile lands and make them available for development purposes (Deininger 2003: 7). Governments responded to the interests of both traditional and the newly emerging elites, and the needs of most rural people. In many African countries the governments have introduced their own independent and often very radical forms of land reform. Such as in the 70th of the 20th century when the Marxist regime in Ethiopia cancelled the feudal system and nationalized the land, which was then distributed to all who were willing to work on it. The land was nationalized also in other African countries such as Tanzania, Guinea, Sudan, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Congo (Zaire), Uganda, Somalia, or Zambia (Wegerif 2004: 4–5).

The first efforts to regulate land ownership appear in the new Constitution and later in the RDP. This program became the ANC election manifesto and it is possible to pick out certain recommendations of the World Bank in this programme. It was also strongly influenced by the compromises that have been negotiated for the purpose of a peaceful regime’s transition. Requirements included in the Freedom Charter of 1955, such as that the land should belong to those who work on it, do not occur in the RDP.

Land reform is critical in terms of providing historical redress for centuries of colonial settler dispossession. In order to address the legacy

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5 Article No. 25 of the Constitution refers to the property and land rights. With regard to the expropriation of land, it might be carried out only in the public interest and with fair compensation to the owner. However, public interest includes the commitment to land reform. The State also undertakes to ensure legislative and other measures to protect the land reform (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996).

6 The land acts and other related land laws, settlement planning, forced removals contributed to overcrowding in the former homelands. It is estimated that more than 3.5 million Africans were forcibly removed and relocated to the homelands and black townships between 1960 and 1980 (Horáková 2007: 56).
of forced removals and racially based land distribution practices, the post-apartheid government’s land reform programme, according to Donaldson and Marais, is based on three related components namely: (1) the restitution of land to people dispossessed of a land right after 1913 in terms of racially discriminatory laws and practices, (2) the redistribution and provision of land for the disadvantaged and the poor for residential, (3) and productive purposes and tenure reforms that would improve tenure security for all South Africans (Donaldson, Marais 2002: 12). The aim of land redistribution is to broaden the ownership of land amongst the previously disadvantaged groups of the South African population, while the tenure reform is an attempt to prove a more secure form of land tenure to rural communities.

According to Platzky and Walker, the 1913 Native Land Act, the Group Areas Act (1950) and the accompanying apartheid legislation led to the forced removal of about 3,5 million people from the land and business sites with little or no compensation. This resulted in a racially skewed pattern of land ownership and distribution where 87% of the land was owned by the white minority while 13% was occupied by the black majority (Platzky and Walker 1985: 130 – 132).

In early 1999, thanks to a government grant (SLAG)\(^8\), about 39 000 families settled around 355,000 hectares of land. It was, however, a very weak success in connection to the objectives of the RDP. Moreover, some farm subsidies were abolished and that caused massive job losses. Between 1994 and 1998, the number of commercial farms’ workforces decreased from 1,4 million to 637,000 (van den Brink, Thomas, Binswanger 2007: 152–201), although the government proclaimed the creation of new jobs.

The land reform process is based on three main pillars, mainly restoration of rights to ancestral land, acquisition of land and securing tenure

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7 The Land Act and other laws and taxes forced people to seek work on the mines and on the white farms. While some black people settled in cities like Johannesburg, most workers were migrants. They travelled to the mines to work and returned home to the rural areas with part of their wages, usually once a year. But Africans were not free to move as they pleased. Passes controlled their movements and made sure they worked either on the mines or on the farms. The pass laws also stopped Africans from leaving their jobs or striking. In 1919 the ANC in Transvaal led a campaign against the passes. The ANC also supported the militant strike by African mineworkers in 1920 (African National Congress 2014).

8 SLAG is an acronym for Settlement Land Acquisition Grant.
to land. Land reform was within the RDP perceived as the main driving force for rural development. The main goal was to redistribute 30% of agricultural land during five years. This goal was first proposed by the World Bank in 1993. The World Bank promoted its own ‘market-led’ model of land reform and argued that redistributing land and creating a class of black smallholders was necessary to avert social and political instability, as well as to promote rural development (Hall 1998).

The African National Congress (ANC) committed itself, as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to a land reform to redistribute 30% of agricultural land to the poor and landless over a period of five years. The World Bank advisors had proposed this target as feasible, noting that 6% of agricultural land is transacted each year – and thus appearing to hold to the incredible notion that all, or nearly all, land on the market would be bought for redistribution (Aliber and Mokoena 2002: 10).

2.2 Implementation of the Land reform: Problems and Prospects

We can find the main objectives of the land reform: redress the injustices of apartheid; foster national reconciliation and stability; underpin economic growth; improve household welfare and alleviate poverty. More specifically, the RDP’s land reform goals had three broad thrusts:

1. **Land restitution** was to be made to those who could prove that their or their family’s land had been stolen under Apartheid;

2. Strengthening of **tenure rights** for the rural poor;

3. **Redistribute** 30% of agricultural land to the rural poor.

Each of these three components of land reform in South Africa is mandated by the Constitution, which not only empowers the state to pursue a programme of land reform, but also obliges it to do so. All three goals were to be achieved before the year 2000. More than a decade after this deadline, none of these goals have been realized.
2.2.1 Land Restitution

The land restitution promised that people who were forced off their land from 1913 (when the Native Land Act was passed) until the end of Apartheid would have their property rights reinstated or be given adequate compensation. The institutional machinery to implement the program includes provincially based restitution commissions and a land claims court that acts as final arbiter in restitution cases.

A restitution programme was adopted in 1994 as a separate process of redistributing land rights from white to black South Africans, to restore land rights to people dispossessed of land since the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913. Claimants could return to their land or demand cash compensation. A Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) was established to assist claimants to make their claims, to investigate claims and prepare them for adjudication by a specially constituted Land Claims Court (LCC).

According to the White Paper\(^9\), the government had set itself targets for the finalization of restitution as follows: a three year period for the lodgement of claims, from 1 May 1995; a five year period for the Commission and the Court to finalize all claims; and a ten year period for the implementation of all court orders (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997). Therefore, the program should be completed by the year 2005. Between 1996 and 1999 about 41 claims had been settled, benefitting 3,508 households, in the following four years 36, 645 claims were settled (about half of the total number claims) benefitting 80, 153 households. According to the statistics issued by the Land Claims Commission, as of February 2004, 48 663 or 61% of all claims have been settled, benefitting 117 326 households. About 76 368 land claims relating to 2.9-million hectares of land under the Land Restitution Programme were settled. A total of 712 of these claims, for 292 995 hectares, were settled between 2009 and December 2011, against a target of 1 845 claims for the period (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2010: 20–28).

\(^9\) The government published a White Paper on South Africa Land Policy in April 1997 with the aim of providing an overall plan for land reform dealing with restitution, restoration and tenure reform.
A serious obstacle to land restitution is that rural claimants insist on returning to their land and in a handful of cases have staged illegal occupations of the land in question to highlight their grievances over delays in finalising their claims. It remains to be seen how the state will navigate the contradiction between black communities’ historical claims to land, and the property rights of its current owners.

2.2.2 Land Tenure Reform

The land tenure reform is designed to provide security to all South Africans under diverse forms of locally appropriate tenure. It includes an initiative to provide legal recognition and to formalize communal land rights in rural areas; it also includes a program to strengthen the rights of tenants on mainly white-owned farms. The object of the reform is to provide a legitimate property right of land to six million families (from which about 3.9 million live in the former Bantustans and 1.3 million families live in shacks in urban areas) (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997: 11; 16–18). A national conference on land tenure was held in 2001 to consider all problem areas and options to address outstanding issues. A wide range of resolutions were adopted by the conference dealing with matters such as achieving a balance between community and individual tenure rights, taking into account customary law and requirements of the constitution, accountability of community structures and the relationship between traditional leadership and other levels of government.

Several laws were adopted but the legislative process of land tenure reform slowly trudged on for several years, until President Mbeki in June 2004 signed the Communal Land Rights Act. This law covered a total of 72% of the population that lived in the former homelands (about 14 million inhabitants). These people managed land that they did not receive through a legal process, but by its economic usage. The purpose of this Act is to legalize their land tenure in areas of the former homelands and to ensure that this land cannot be revoked, or used without their consent. Against the law sharply protested many experts, land organizations and activists from the movement Landless People’s Movement (LPM).

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10 Landless People’s Movement is independent social movement. It was founded in July 2001 by combining several local organizations formed by people without access to land and mainly rural residents who live in the poor slums on the periphery of
Some experts argue that the possession of property, which according to Kariuki (2004) has its roots in Western jurisdiction, contributes to a greater development of agriculture, than systems based on a common possession, which are in the framework of the economic development seen as counterproductive (Kariuki 2004: 5–7).

Another point of contention is the fact that the law reinforces existing gender inequalities in land ownership. Women in this direction are facing serious problems, since the land is allocated exclusively to men. Women can gain access to land only through their husband. However, in the case of divorce women lose the entitlement to land. This includes loss of housing, because the house is mostly bound to the land. In the event of the death of her husband, who did not make a will, the land (and the house) is inherited by male-relatives, while the widow (or daughter) is not entitled to gain anything. This reinforces the fact that decisions about how the land is farmed during the marriage is only made by men.

This unequal treatment between men and women has its base, according to Kariuki, in the historical context and for this reason it would be very difficult to create a balance with regard to gender inequality (Kariuki 2004: 14–19). Unfortunately, the law did not change institutionally entrenched discriminatory rules that already exist for a long time in public institutions. Moreover, tenure reform does not solve the question of how to overcome the divide between the overcrowded and under-resourced communal areas, and the wealthy commercial farming areas.

### 2.2.3 Land Redistribution Programme

Land redistribution is aimed at providing the disadvantaged and the poor with access to land for residential and productive purpose (White Paper On South African Land Policy 1997). The system of redistribution is focused on the change of property rights. It should be implemented on the basis of supply and demand, where the sales would follow market prices. In the first phase of redistribution (1995) the cities (Greenberg 2004: 1). In the 2004 election, the movement established a nationwide initiative „No Land! No House! No Vote!“, which boycotted the elections, particularly the government policy, which according to them is unable to provide the basic human needs such as access to land.
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs established the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which should assist the poor people to purchase land. The SLAG was in 2000 replaced by a program Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), which removed the criterion of poverty and more focused on creating black commercial farms. This shift was consistent with the changes in national economic policy, which was focused on economic growth in line with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR).

The White Paper on South Africa Land Policy (1997) laid out an approach to land reform based on market and the limited role of the state. The role of the state was to assistance in the purchase of land, and the state could not be the buyer or the landowner. It prefered to provide financial support for the purchase. The first program of land redistribution was financially supported by a Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which the government provided to families with incomes of less than 1,500 rand per month. The target group were primarily poor residents. The government has made it clear that the main aim of land reform is poverty reduction (Grants and Services Policy of the Department of Land Affairs 2001: 2). A survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs between 1998 and 1999 revealed a number of weaknesses in the implementation and quality of group projects that were created within the SLAG. In June 1999, a new Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs Thoko Didiza was appointed, based on this survey, she immediately declared the necessary changes in the concept of redistribution and immediately ordered the postponement of other projects within the SLAG. In February 2000, the Minister issued a press statement in which she criticized the procedure of the SLAG. Primarily she focused on the poorly defined goals, over-reliance on market forces, which did not yield the expected results, and the grants which appeared as inappropriate for the creation of a new group of black commercial farmers (Baregu, Landsberg 2003: 99). She also proposed a new approach to land redistribution, namely the program of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). The LRAD program was launched in August 2001 in the province of Nkomazi Mpumalanga.
The LRAD\textsuperscript{11} is not like the SLAG exclusively bound to the laws of the market but it is adapted to the proposals of the World Bank and its experts were also involved in the development of this programme. This move follows the opening of the domestic market and creating an attractive investment climate within the GEAR policy, which was introduced in 1996. The LRAD places greater emphasis on ensuring the economic benefits of redistribution of land and supporting black commercial farming. At the same time as SLAG, it aims to improve living standards, incomes of the poor population and change the land tenure inherited from apartheid.

Under the SLAG and LRAD programmes, a total of one million hectares was transferred between 1994 and 2001. However, the LRAD’s critics argue that the objectives to realize the land redistribution failed and from the programme a small group of privileged people benefited (Moyo 2004). Wegerif argues that such models can never bring important changes in the land tenure because only the rich people are able to enter the market and catch the opportunities that the programmes offer. Moreover, the LRAD does not deal with the land rights of women (Wegerif 2004: 6–8). In addition, it lacks specific competencies for local governments and especially the links between the wider subsections of land reform and rural development.

The redistribution programme is also criticised for being very slow. The target of transferring 30\% of commercial farmland by 2015 would require a sevenfold increase per annum of transfers under the redistribution scheme (Hall 2004: 25).

There was a significant liberalization of the agricultural sector and the promotion of free trade in agricultural commodities. Wegerif states that during the 80\textsuperscript{s}, the government provided financial assistance in the form of grants (more than 4 billion rand) to 27 thousand white farmers. At the end of the 90\textsuperscript{s}, the government’s subsidies, financial support and other protection were removed and the South African agricultural market has become one of the most unprotected in the world (Wegerif 2004: 18–24).

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme was designed to help previously disadvantaged citizens from African, Coloured and Indian communities to buy land or agricultural implements specifically for agricultural purposes. (LRAD 2001).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Critics argue that the liberalization of the agricultural sector only increases the leadership of those who firmly hold the reins of the economy, specifically white citizens. Therefore, the support of a competitive fight requires a redistribution of positions of dominant firms that supplies mainly food, tobacco and alcohol. Without this control and tariff protection many South African farms would find it difficult to compete with American and European farmers that receive generous subsidies from their governments. For small black farms it is almost impossible.

Many experts are questioning, whether the land reform based on market principles of supply and demand, could bring the desired change in land tenure rights. In this regard some of them require the more stringent approach of state intervention (see Wegerif 2004).

Proposals to radicalize land reform were officially declared during the Land Reform Summit, held in Johannesburg in July 2005. They demanded accelerated expropriation of farms whose owners do not want to cooperate within the controlled sale based on supply and demand (Horáková 2007: 56). The main difficulty in the purchasing of the farms is currently assessing their values. Farm owners and their association Agri-South Africa promote the assessment according to market prices, but the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing adheres to assessing the value according to the productive prices. Reform is hampered not only by a lack of funds, but also the lack of skilled bureaucrats at relevant offices. The strongest argument for land reform is the idea that it can create a positive environment for the growth of agricultural production, which will spur economic growth and help reduce poverty. But the fact remains that a large part of the previously white farms that were divided among new black owners are no longer effective.

3. The future of the land reform

In 2013, South Africa marks the centenary of the Natives’ Land Act that excluded ‘members of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa’ from the occupation or ownership of about 90% of the country’s land. Two years after the end of apartheid, in 1996, about 60,000 white commercial farmers owned almost 70% of land classified as agricultural and leased a further 19% (Statistics South Africa 2014; Africa Research
In 2013, the original 1999 deadline for the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land to black South Africans was again postponed from 2014 to 2025. According to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (RDLR), an estimated R29.7 billion (US$3.2 billion) was spent on the land reform programme between 1994 and 2013 (ANC 2014). Since the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act initiated the process of compensation, by 2013 about 77,148 restitution claims had been settled nationwide, where more than 80% of claims were related to urban land and settled by 2006. A vast majority of beneficiaries – 92% – opted to receive financial compensation at a cost of R6 billion (US$652m). To satisfy successful claimants demanding the return of land, 1.44m hectares were acquired for an estimated R10.8 billion (US$1.2 billion) (ANC 2014). As mentioned RDLR Minister Gugile Nkwinti points out that these numbers clearly show who has benefited from the land restitution programme (ANC 2014).

With regard to redistribution, since 1994 there was a long evolution of the programmes and the means by which land was redistributed. The Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG, 1995-2000) was followed by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Programme (LRAD, 2001-10) and in 2006, the government adopted the Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), which leases high-potential land to chosen beneficiaries with the option of future purchase. The following alterations to land reform brought the long-awaited 2011 Green Paper which included a new four-tier structure of land tenure. However, the Green Paper faces many problems. Critics especially predict more red tape, lengthy legal challenges from landowners, and the alienation of commercial farmers. The state itself cannot provide much more extra land. In 2013, the completion of a land audit established that 78% of South African land is private and 22% state-owned. The RDLR blamed the inability to provide further, much-needed detail on an “institutional challenge” (The New Age 2013).
At this point it is possible to compare the process of land reform in South Africa with experiences that took place in Zimbabwe. Both countries had similar demographical and historical backgrounds and they implemented the same market-based land reform. However, there are two main differences between these two countries that are connected with institutional structure which was not predictable in Zimbabwe, as there were fewer assurances against abrupt changes. On the other hand, South Africa’s democratic and more mature institutional practise

Source: Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2014
indicated the possible success of the land reform. However, both countries experienced slow progress as a result of high costs and politicians often made public threats toward coercive measures. Each country’s land reform involved multiple parties and multiple attempts to amend land reform. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa initially implemented a market approach “willing buyer, willing seller” (WBWS) which is based on a transfer of land ownership only when sellers and buyers agree on the land price (Department of Land Affairs 2006: 4–5). In Zimbabwe a willing buyer, willing seller programme outlined in the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement aimed to resolve the imbalance in landholdings. This agreement dictated the terms of land reform to be ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ for the next ten years, and in exchange, the Zimbabwean government was promised the subsidization of half of land reform costs by the UK (Palmer 1990: 163–181).

But the Zimbabwean process of land reform was slow, expensive and poorly planned. Moreover, it was clear that some changes would be made after the Lancaster Agreement expired. In 1992, compulsory acquisition with compensation was introduced. By 1996, 3.5m hectares had been shared among 71,000 households – far below the target of 8.3m hectares and 162,000 households. Only 19% of the transferred hectares were classified as prime agricultural land (Statistics South Africa 2014).

In Zimbabwe the transfer of land was effected through violent means, especially after the 2000 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections. Incursions onto white-owned farms commenced in 1999, against a backdrop of discord between donors and the government over how to implement land reform. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), launched by the ZANU-PF government in 2000, legalised land invasions. About 10m hectares of white-owned agricultural land were expropriated and redistributed amongst 175,000 households. By 2011, 70% of Zimbabwe’s agricultural land was cultivated by smallholder producers and 13% by medium-scale farmers (Moyo 2011: 493–531). The outcomes of land reform are different because it mainly depends on geography, quality and size of land, and local politics. But generally it can be argued that the land reform was not as successful as it was expected. Commercial agricultural production fell by more than 60% between 1998 and 2008, and an estimated 150,000 black commercial farm workers lost their jobs. In 2010-2011,
maize production was 1.5m metric tonnes, only marginally short of the average in the 1990s (Africa Research Institute 2013). Nonetheless, some authors accept that the Zimbabwean restrictive policy options became a source of certainty for the policy, and thus Zimbabwe’s land reform process was speedier and more coordinated than in South Africa. Based on this argument, we can claim that the ANC lacks a political leader with dictatorial tendencies like Robert Mugabe who would carry out a radical form of land reform. The existence of radical groups of landless people, specifically the Landless People’s Movement (LPM)\textsuperscript{12}, shows us that some sections of South African society are prepared to take the land by force. However, their major weakness has been the lack of political support. This situation has changed in the last two years with the rise of the personality of Julius Malema, the leader of the political party Economic Freedom Fighters.

Julius Malema’s priority is land reform without compensation. In order to fulfil this plan, Malema needs to change the constitution. Together with the ANC that in the last elections received a little over 62 percent and with the EFF’s 6 percent it will be possible to change the structure. But there is also another problem that could influence the whole process of the land reform. The government does not know exactly how much land is owned by the state or white people. A land survey in 2012 showed there was more land owned by government than actually it was claimed. However, Malema said: “The settlers committed a black genocide and made the black land owners into slaves. We’ll pay whatever price for this land. If the leaders of this revolution are not prepared to fight for this land, the economic freedom fighters will.” (Mail Guardian 2012). Therefore, it can be expected that Malema’s priority is to solve the issue of land reform in an even more forcible way.

Despite all the plans as mentioned above, the question of land reform in South Africa is still unresolved and the government deals with the little transfer from whites to blacks. The majority of South Africans continue to be landless or with insecure land rights. These include those who live in communal areas especially in the former homelands and Self Governing Territories. Land dispossession in South Africa produced negative consequences such as the consignment of the

\textsuperscript{12} The Landless People’s Movement (LPM), loosely inspired by Brazil’s Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), emerged in 2001 as an initiative of the National Land Committee (NLC) (Greenberg 2004: 15–18).
majority to the most unproductive land, the inequitable distribution of land ownership largely in favour of a minority racial group, the dislocation of the social and economic systems of the indigenous people in relation to land use, and tenantization through labour tenancy (Arrighi, Aschoff and Scully 2010: 410–438). Although, the promise to create a million agriculture-related jobs by 2030 might suggest that the ANC recognises the opportunity in agriculture. However, the current model is not compatible with a critical need to create more rural jobs. Between 2006 and 2012, the number of South Africans employed in agriculture fell from 1.09 million to 661,000 (Think Africa Press 2013). Since the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle was abandoned it has led to the inflation of land prices, new legislation was accepted. Especially, the Expropriation Bill in 2013 which should provide the expropriation of property for a public purpose or in the public interest (Expropriation Bill 2013: 2). It is expected that expropriation through just and equitable compensation could lead to speed up land transfers and succeeded in the areas where the WBWS approach failed, specifically the inflation of market prices which made purchases disproportionately expensive.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a greater financial and political reform programme for land reform, and without a restructuring of the rural economy, meandering land and agrarian reform will become increasingly susceptible to political radicalism, which we can see nowadays, and which gains its supporters mainly from among the landless and poor citizens in rural areas.

Conclusion

The theme of the article was the transformation of South African society through the RDP. In this way, the central idea that interconnects all parts of the article is the transformation process that occurred in South Africa after the fall of apartheid. This process, which was realized in socio-economic and political fields, was crucial for the creation of a society that would be free from racial intolerance and prejudice.

The part that deals with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) provides the answer to the first research question: What principles are the RDP based on? The program is based on six core principles, which are linked together. The first principle brings
strategies to harness all resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be sustained into the future. The next principle demands the participation of citizens, regardless of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor. The RDP was also based on a peace and security that would involve all people and must be built on and expand the National Peace Initiative. Nation-building is the next principle and therefore the RDP would develop the economic, political and social viability that can ensure national sovereignty. The RDP also relies on reconstruction and development, where development is portrayed as a marginal effort of redistribution to areas of urban and rural poverty. In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education and training for all citizens. This will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the economy, and by modernising the infrastructure and human resource development. The last principle deals with the democratisation of South Africa that must begin to transform both the state and civil society, and it contributes to the reconstruction and development of the country. These six principles are linked to the strategies that show the way how to achieve their successful fulfilment: meeting basic needs; developing our human resources; building the economy; democratising the state and society.

The second research question was answered by the part that examined the RDP as a tool of socio-economic transformation: What is the link between the RDP and the socio-economic transformation of South Africa? The RDP as an instrument of socio-economic transformation addresses economic inequalities, the democratization of the economy and structural problems. In this way, the RDP is, amongst other things, an economic strategy that should ensure and underlie the disciplinary force for the market and private sector, and sustain the high growth and development of the country. In 1994, the RDP was adopted and its aim was to reduce the problems caused by the socioeconomic consequences of the apartheid regime, in particular poverty alleviation and improving access to social services. Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence each other. This strategy brought greater financial discipline, but it failed in key areas. Instead of creating new jobs, unemployment rose and economic growth also
lagged behind the stated expectations. The economic stability objectives have generally been achieved, but progress on social demand has been slow and below the expectations of South Africans.

Land reform is one of the ways in which the past racial exclusions and inequalities are being addressed, and through land reform the social and economic relations are to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the apartheid system in South Africa. In this way, land reform in South Africa is the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to agricultural land might be seen as critical.

Land reform was conceived as a means by which the South African state would provide redress for the past injustices and promote development. It would pursue these two goals by restoring land rights to those dispossessed by segregation and apartheid through a land restitution programme, securing and upgrading the rights of those with insecure rights to land through a land tenure reform programme, and changing the racially skewed land ownership patterns through a land redistribution programme. The limitations of land reform relate not only to its scale but also to how resources are to be allocated, for what purpose, and to whom. However, the National Department of Agriculture (NDA) and its provincial departments have been widely recognized as failing to re-orientate their services to meet the needs of a new clientele and to provide these services to poorer land reform beneficiaries (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997).

The question of land and agricultural reform in South Africa remains largely unresolved. This issue is connected and influenced by other problems of the country such as substantial job losses. Into this growing divide between rich and poor, HIV/AIDS is a largely unaccounted factor which appears to be rapidly changing the profile of households, and the structure of the labour force, in ways that underline the vulnerability of the poor. A huge dissatisfaction within South African society is also manifested by the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), influenced by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) in Brazil. This movement was launched at the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in 2001 with a campaign entitled “Landlessness = Racism”. Its ‘Week of the Landless’ during the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) in 2002 showed the extent to which its slogans demanding land, food and jobs resonated with thousands of rural people, bussed in from all provinces, but also with residents of Johannesburg’s townships and informal settlements (Greenberg 2002). Land reform, food security, market reform and access to a balanced diet are each distinct aspects of the same problem, none of which have been adequately addressed, let alone resolved. Therefore, the success of land reform is largely dependent on the resolution of other issues and cannot be solved in isolation from wider changes in the political economy.

In 1996 less than 1% of the population owned over 80% of agricultural land in the country, so the government of the ANC committed themselves to land reform. They carried out this task through three goals: land restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution. All three goals were to be achieved before the year 2000. More than a decade after this deadline, none of these goals have been realized. In some areas some of the goals were achieved, but reform is still hampered by a lack of financial resources and by a lack of skilled bureaucrats. The black majority remains poor and they are getting frustrated because of the unfulfilled promises of the government. In this sense, education can be seen as the base of prosperity, or at least an escape from poverty. The transition of the population from poverty to prosperity may ensure only quality education, health care and employment aid, all supported by economic growth. For that reason, the government should in the coming years focus primarily on the fight against crime, corruption, and especially against AIDS. In the light of events and the process of land reform in Zimbabwe, there is a growing conviction that the delivery of land reform must be accelerated, thus a widespread public debate is urgently required as to what kind of land reform South Africa needs.

References


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Křičková, Aneta: RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

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### Table 1: Major indicators that show increasing frustration regarding the slow pace of socio-economic transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>In 1994, an estimated 17 million South Africans were living in poverty, corresponding to between 35 and 40 per cent of the total population. Twenty years later, it is estimated that between 45 and 55 per cent are living in poverty, which represents an increase both in absolute numbers and proportion since 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Public works program, established in 1994, has provided during five years a work for almost 240 thousand people. It was mainly the construction of sewerage system and hospital facilities, especially in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. This program has been reviewed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as a very successful (ILO 2007). At the end of 2009, the official unemployment rate was 24 per cent, but the expanded definition, which includes those of working age who have given up looking for work, was much higher. Furthermore, an estimated one in five workers is employed in the informal sector, which often involves low and haphazard income. At the end of 2012, the unemployment rate was 24.9 per cent. Compared to the same period in 2011, a net increase of 80 000 in employment was observed in the 4th quarter of 2012. This was mainly due to growth in Community and social services (126 000), Finance and other business services (65 000) and Agriculture (55 000). However, job losses were observed in Trade and Manufacturing (139 000 and 59 000 respectively) in the same period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to water</td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In 1994, there was estimated that about 12 million South Africans lacked access to water and 21 million lacked sanitation services. In 1998, aqueducts began mainly in rural areas, collectively build. Nearly 1.3 million people who previously used water from wells or bought it from trucks, gained access to clean drinkable water. In March 2000, after almost two years the number of people with access to drinking water almost doubled when it was completed a total of 236 projects. Statistics South Africa Census shows a significant improvement in access to piped water in South Africa, with the number of households with no access dropping to 8.8% in 2011 from 15.6% in 2001. Nearly half, or 46.3%, of households have tap water inside their homes (up from 32.3% in 2001), according to census 2011, while 27.1% have tap water inside their yards (down from 29.0%), 11.7% have tap water on their community stand less than 200 metres from their homes (up from 10.7%), and 6.2% have to walk more than 200 metres to reach tap water on their community stand (down from 12.4%). With the current development it is estimated that about 2030 every citizen will have an access to clean water.
| Electrification | From 1994 to May 2000 about 1.75 million inhabitants were connected to the national grid and another 600,000 were planned to connect in the next 3 years. Most of the electrical distribution systems led directly across rural areas. In that same period, the share of electrified rural dwellings increased from 12% to 42% and in 2004 it was already 51%. In 2007, electricity was introduced in 64% of all households in the country. However, more probabilistic is that at the end of 2012 about 80% of all households in South Africa will be electrified. According to the South African Bureau of Statistics (2007) between 1996 and 2007, the proportion of households that use electricity for lighting increased from 57.6% to 80%. According to the census, conducted in October 2011 by South African Bureau of Statistics, 84.7% of South African households use electricity for lighting (up from 70.2% in 2001), 73.9% use electricity for cooking (up from 52.2%), and 58.8% use electricity for heating (up from 49.9%). |
In 1994, there was an estimated backlog of at least three million houses. Despite significant progress, the housing shortage was still between three and four million units in 2005 and 40% of non-urban households still had no access to clean water. Lodge (2002) reported that between 1994 and 2001 was built due to government subsidies more than 1.12 million houses, which received 5 million (out of 12.5 million) of people without proper shelter. The pace of construction reached a peak in 1997, after this year already decreased. In 1996, to support housing it was spent 3.4% of the state budget, while at the turn of 1999/2000 it was only 1.4%. However, since 2001 can be seen an increasing number of households living in formal dwellings, from 68.5% to 77.6%, while the number living in traditional dwellings dropped from 14.8% to 7.9% and the number living in informal dwellings dropped from 16.4% to 13.6%. Census 2011 also showed a marked improvement in household sanitation in the country, with 60.1% of households using flush toilets (toilets connected to the public sewerage system) in 2011, up from 51.9% in 2001.

South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. In 1994, 5% of the population – mostly whites – owned 88% of the nation’s wealth. In terms of income inequality, the Gini coefficient in 1996 was estimated at 0.69, in comparison to an average of 0.43 for industrialized countries. Since 1994, inter-racial inequality has diminished. The incomes for black households increased an average 169% over 10 years (since 2002), their annual earnings are 60,613 rand ($6,987), or a sixth of that for whites. Incomes for white households increased 88% to 365,134 rand in the past decade, the data shows. Racial inequality is compounded by significant gender and geographic inequality.
HIV/AIDS

HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics increased from one per cent in 1990 to 25% in 2001, translating into an estimated infection rate of one in five adults. Here, too, women are disproportionately affected, and there are also significant provincial disparities. Between 1995 and 2000, mainly as a result of the AIDS pandemic in the country, decreased life expectancy from 64.1 to 53.4 years. According the census (2011) South Africa’s population increased 16% since the last census was conducted in 2001 and compares with 50.6 million estimated in mid-2011. About 9% of the population is of mixed race, 8.9% white and 2.5% Asian. About one in nine people in South Africa are infected with HIV, the virus that causes the disease, according to the government. The census found 3.37 million children under the age of 17, or 19% of the total, had lost one or both parents, with AIDS cited as a major contributor. The reform of public health care, which was open to all citizens, hit a deep crisis. This may be demonstrated by child mortality rate under the age of 5 years. In 1990 it reached 64 per 1,000 births, in 1994 was 51, in 1998 dropped to 45, but in 2000 it climbed to 59. In 2012 the infant mortality rate was 42.67 deaths/1,000 live births and maternal mortality rate 300 deaths/100,000 live births (UNICEF 2013). Another example is the settlement of Soweto, where in 1994 the local clinic visited nearly 950,000 patients. In 2000, the number of patients increased to 2 million, but number of medics dropped to 500 from 800.

Table 2: Key labour market indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oct-Dec 2011</th>
<th>Jul-Sep 2012</th>
<th>Oct-Dec 2012</th>
<th>Qtt to Qtt change</th>
<th>Year on year change</th>
<th>Qtt to Qtt change</th>
<th>Year on year change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population 15–64 yrs</td>
<td>32 670</td>
<td>33 018</td>
<td>33 128</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>17 741</td>
<td>18 313</td>
<td>18 078</td>
<td>-235</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>-1,3</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>13 497</td>
<td>13 645</td>
<td>13 577</td>
<td>-68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal sector (non-agricultural)</td>
<td>9 616</td>
<td>9 663</td>
<td>9 611</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
<td>-0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector (non-agricultural)</td>
<td>2 134</td>
<td>2 197</td>
<td>2 205</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>3,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>8,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private households</td>
<td>1 118</td>
<td>1 124</td>
<td>1 076</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-4,3</td>
<td>-3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4 244</td>
<td>4 667</td>
<td>4 501</td>
<td>-166</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>-3,6</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not economically active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discouraged work-seekers</td>
<td>14 929</td>
<td>14 705</td>
<td>15 050</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (not economically active)</td>
<td>2 315</td>
<td>2 170</td>
<td>2 257</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>-2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate (% )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>25,5</td>
<td>24,9</td>
<td>-0,6</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/population ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(absorption)</td>
<td>41,3</td>
<td>41,3</td>
<td>41,0</td>
<td>-0,3</td>
<td>-0,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation rate</td>
<td>54,3</td>
<td>55,5</td>
<td>54,6</td>
<td>-0,9</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics South Africa 2013: 1

13 Approximately 4,5 million persons were looking for work in the 4th quarter of 2012, of which 3,1 million (or 68,0%) have been looking for work for a period of 1 year or longer. Furthermore, 61,3% of the job seekers did not have matric. The unemployment rate remains high among the youth aged 15-24 years (50,9%) and this group is likely to put more pressure on the labour market because approximately 3,3 million (31,6%) of the 10,4 million in this age group are not in employment, education or training (Statistics South Africa 2013: 1).