Kuir ë Garang: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATIONAL ESPOUSAL …

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATIONAL ESPOUSAL: A POLITICAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DR. JOHN GARANG DE MABIOR’S “NEW SUDAN VISION”

Kuir ë Garang

Abstract: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) has for decades presented a “New Sudan” as its “vision.” But SPLM/A’s official ideology was socialism and its vision a united secular and socialist Sudan. With time, this vision became “New Sudan” and its presumptive guiding ideology became “The New Sudan Vision” (NSV) without any official institutionalisation of this NSV. In fact, “NSV” does not appear in the Movement’s founding manifesto until the revision of the manifesto in 2008 when NSV was incoherently included. I argue, therefore, that the New Sudan Vision was not really an SPLM/A political ideology but John Garang’s ideology. Besides, its immediate disappearance in South Sudan after the death of John Garang and the overwhelming vote for independence was an unequivocal rejection of NSV by the South Sudanese.

Keywords: political ideology, Sudan, South Sudan, marginalisation, oppression, civil war

Introduction and Context

The issue of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army’s (SPLM/A’s) political ideology has always been controversial (Alier 1990; Akol 2003; Dor 2017; Nyaba 2016, 1997; Young 2005; Deng 2010). The SPLM/A, while initially made up mostly of Southern Sudanese, who were fighting against their social, religious, economic and political marginalisation by Arabised and Islamic elites in Khartoum, changed itself into an inclusive and transformative Movement the aim of which was to change the nature of the political power structure in Sudan. Unlike its predecessors, Anyanya I and II, which were ideologically
separatist, SPLM/A claimed to have been fighting for a united but transformed Sudan in which no single religious or racial group could position itself as the face of the country. This call for an inclusive Sudan ideologically appealed to marginalised Sudanese in the geographical Northern Sudan and to some Arab intellectuals. At its founding, the Movement’s value system was officially socialism, and its vision a united secular and socialist Sudan. With time, this united socialist Sudan became rationalised as “New Sudan” and its guiding ideology became “The New Sudan Vision” (NSV). Although “united socialist Sudan” appears in the Movement’s founding manifesto, the phrase “New Sudan” does not. Those who have done some critical overview of the NSV, like Malual Dor (2017), John Young (2005), and Adwok Nyaba (2016), question NSV’s coherence as the political ideology of the SPLM/A. Lual Deng (2013) is a self-identified “Garangist,” who has unsuccessfully, in my opinion, attempted to defend NSV’s coherence and its prominent absence in the original manifesto.

Yet, many South Sudanese, especially the self-identified members or supporters of SPLM, uncritically assume that NSV was the political ideology of SPLM/A. I say “uncritical” because some SPLM/A members connect NSV with SPLM/A without any critical analysis of NSV as an ideology and its connection with the Movement. They see this connection as obvious. This was demonstrated when I posted (Garang K. 2018) a quote from Malual Ayom Dor’s doctoral thesis on Facebook on 6 January 2018 in which he questioned the lack of a clear political ideology and institutionalism within the SPLM/A. The responses were swift, some dismissive yet illustrative: “This note is to correct one false notion being leveled at the original SPLM vis-a-vis the history of South Sudan,” charged Joseph Deng Garang (2018),¹ “especially the casual charge that the Liberation Movement never had any developed political ideology whatsoever.” “This ideology [NSV] culminated in the drafting and signing of CPA [comprehensive Peace Agreement] to grant South Sudanese a choice of their destiny through a referendum. Sometimes, we discredit SPLM unfairly,” wrote Athian Mayen (2018) on the Facebook post about NSV. “Ideology is not anything different from what ‘New Sudan’ was unless [a] new definition is brought about!” Junior William Deng (2018) commented. “The SPLM/A survival and operations was precisely built on deep ideological principles,

¹ Joseph Deng Garang is a political commentator. His response was inspired by the same quote from Dor’s PhD thesis that I posted on Facebook (Garang K. 2018).
otherwise the NIF [National Islamic Front] would have crashed the SPLM/A many years ago,” argued Peter Thuch (2018). However, Peter Kuot (2018), another commentator, disagreed: “New Sudan vision was not a political ideology and Dr. John Garang himself admitted that people were devided [sic] on the definition of it.”

Given the then centrality of the NSV in Sudan and South Sudan, it is easy to take NSV and its connection with SPLM for granted. Nevertheless, for the non-scholarly majority and others like Deng, Thuch and Mayen quoted above, the reason for such a face-value acceptance of NSV as SPLM/A’s political ideology stems from the confusion of what it means for an individual leader to espouse a given ideology, and for the party of such a leader to embrace meaningfully and functionalise that given ideology as the structuring value system. Even Mansur Khalid, a former Sudanese minister of foreign affairs who was close to Garang as an advisor, understood that. As one analyst, Daniel Akech Thiong (2018), recently told me, “I agree with your general thesis: the ideology of NS remained Garang’s. I did interview Mansour Khalid in the past and he said something similar.”

John Young has a similar assessment: “The SPLM/A has never developed an ideology that was coherent and acceptable to its followers because it always had to be subject to the dictates and needs of Garang” (Young 2005: 539).

This essay is not a comprehensive analysis of ideology; however, it is about how ideology relates meaningfully to party political structures and functionality long after the leader, who invented the ideas informing that ideology, passes on. When Lenin died, revolutionary socialism did not die with him in the Soviet Union. When Mandela died, South Africa did not abandon the African National Congress (ANC) vision for a non-racial, democratic South Africa. When Hitler died, there was obviously an excellent moral and political reason for the immediate abandonment of Nazism as the structuring political ideology in Germany. Accordingly, the ease and the rapidity with which an ideology is abandoned says a great deal about whether the ideology was merely an imposition on that given political entity, or whether it was embraced but then abandoned for a good reason. Consequently, the connection between ideology and SPLM/A is what I problematise.

Daniel Akech Thiong is an independent South Sudanese consultant (private communication via Facebook, 12 August 2018).
in this article. Hence, the central thesis of the present article is that SPLM/A as a political body had no coherent or fixed ideology even when its founding leader, John Garang, had an elaborate personal ideology—NSV—that he imposed on SPLM/A members for better or for worse.

The word “imposition” can be controversial so I will qualify my argument. During the first round of peace talks in the Nigerian capital Abuja (Abuja 1) under President Ibrahim Babangida, the two factions of the SPLM/A (Nasir and Torit) decided to unite their negotiation position on the issue of self-determination. However, Garang later came out strongly against it on 8 July 1992: “some members of our own delegation ... might have created a wrong and false impression, that the Movement had changed its position and principle objective of a united New Sudan” (in Akol 2003: 123). Two years later, on 20 May 1994 in Nairobi, Garang accepted the right of self-determination in IGAD’s Declaration of Principles (DOPs). The two SPLM/A factions agreed in the DOPs that, “The rights of self-determination of the people of Southern Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed” (Malok 2009: 318). Garang’s influence and monopoly in SPLM policy has also been noted by scholars. According to Nyaba (1997: 52), SPLM/A “‘Combat Intelligence’... throttled independent and liberal political opinion.” This “throttling” was a legacy of the Garang-Mengistu alliance and its imposition of socialism and militarism on the SPLM/A (Bayissa 2002). Young (2005) summed it up well when arguing that Garang “created an artificial unity based on a forced acceptance of his rule” (545). With the DOPs, and the geopolitical changes after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 (Nyaba 1997; Malok 2008; Bayissa 2007), Garang found it difficult to impose his will on the people of Southern Sudan and on SPLM/A itself. It is therefore important to examine, critically, SPLM/A’s commitment to the New Sudan Vision.

The sources used in this qualitative article come from translated revolutionary songs, speeches of Southern leaders, especially SPLM’s
founding leader, John Garang, as well as archival and scholarly sources dealing with the politics and history of Sudan and South Sudan. These sources also include responses to an NSV post on social media. The questions to be answered in the present article are: (1) Was the New Sudan Vision a political ideology? (2) If so, was it Garang’s personal ideology or SPLM’s political ideology? From here, the article is organised as follows. The first section deals with what is meant by a political ideology including the problem of ideology generally in Africa. This will be followed by a historical background that informed the development of NSV. After this the presentation of what the New Sudan Vision was, is followed by a critical discussion of whether or not NSV was SPLM’s ideology or Garang’s personal ideology that he imposed on the Movement. I end with a conclusion about my doubts regarding the relationship between the SPLM and the New Sudan Vision as an ideology.

Political Ideology

Erikson and Tedin (2003: 64) argue that ideology is a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.” What is important in Erikson’s and Tedin’s understanding of ideology is its role in structuring a society. Apartheid in South Africa or Social Democracy in Norway are prominent examples. In Sudan, Arabism and Islamism have been this structuring “set of beliefs.” Essentially, ideology is not just something people profess; it has practical utility and value commitment. For Parsons (1951: 24), “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured.” Parson’s definition is similar to Erikson’s and Tedin’s definition above because “interpretation of the environment” is related to how ideology structures society. Eagleton (1991: 1), in one of his various definitions, argues that ideology is “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class.” Like Eagleton, Pesqueux (2002: 2) states that ideology is a “system of ideas an individual or a social group holds over time to which they are committed.” Although the definitions offered by the above theorists can be applied to different types of ideologies, they have underlying similarities. In other words, the “body of ideas,” “set of beliefs,” “shared framework of mental models” and “system of
ideas” all offer directives about ways in which society can order itself. In order to constitute a political ideology, these ideas, beliefs or mental models must be espoused meaningfully rather than superficially by a given social or political entity over a given period and for a certain objective. So ideologically speaking, what are these beliefs, ideas, and mental models the SPLM embraced as the content of the New Sudan Vision as a political project? I will discuss this in the NSV section below.

The Problem of Ideology in Contemporary Africa

In Africa today, there is a dissonance between what leaders say they do and what they actually do. Since they are not accountable to their citizens, they can claim anything. The present section is meant to show that South Sudan is not alone when it comes to the problem of ideology and neither is it alone in terms of claiming something without the need to prove a claim with evidentiary support. So, undoubtedly, the lack of ideology (or its clarity) affects many African parties in their strategic visions and development goals (Bamikole 2012; Olanrewaju 2015; Fadakinte 2014), whether these parties are in power or in the opposition. Generally, there are two main problems with ideology in Africa. The first is a complete lack of ideology; the second the want of clarity in a professed ideology. This means that the politics of the country runs according to the desires of leaders rather than a formalised ideological agenda and policy. In the latter case, there is usually an extant ideology, but its functions and value system are incoherent. Given the complexity of ideological problems in Africa, I can only illustrate this basic fact by providing three examples.

We see this lack of ideology in Kenya given the ease with which political parties are abandoned and new parties or coalitions are formed. As Wasilwa (2016) has noted, “politics … is non-ideological” and elections are “based on clientelism and a pool of passionately ignorant citizens.” Kenyan coalitions and parties are formed on the basis of their leaders’ political needs, so politicians use tribes rather than sound ideological platforms to garner votes. Lack of ideological clarity and consistency is also an issue in Ethiopia: from centralised monarchism, to the Marxist-Leninism of Mengistu (Takeuchi 2007), to the ethnic federalism and revolutionary democracy of Meles Zenawi (Adegehe 2009). Under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu’s Marxist-Leninism, Ethiopia was under a strong centralised governance structure and
totalitarianism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Mengistu renounced communism in March 1990 (Walters 2009: 196) and embraced economic liberalisation (Nwase 1994). As The New York Times wrote on 22 May 1991, Mengistu had “moved to loosen restraints over the nation’s politics and economy” (Krauss 1991). It would be less than a year before the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted him. While Ethiopia is still facing political challenges, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has ushered in a seemingly promising era of political openness. This ideological confusion and lack of clarity is also evident in Uganda. President Milton Obote embraced socialism in his “move to the left” while Idi Amin’s reign was a military dictatorship (Mubangizi 2015). President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) hovered between socialism and free market and now teeters on military dictatorship (Mubangizi 2015) dressed in a liberal democracy suit. Museveni professes democratic openness but the political space in Uganda is small as shown by arbitrary arrests or the confinement of opposition figures such as Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (aka Bobi Wine) and Dr. Kizza Besigye. Ironically, Museveni (2000: 219) said in 1990, “We should not practice dictatorship under the guise of independence because independence does not and cannot mean dictatorship.”

South Sudan is now facing the same ideological problem. I hope the present essay will contribute to the debate and shed some light on the confusion about ideology, which crystalised within SPLM/A’s politico-military high Command (PMHC), now in SPLM Political Bureau value system, and other political parties in Africa. Essentially, claims need to be proven not just professed and expected to be accepted at face value.

The Fundamental Problem of the Sudan

To understand the genesis of the New Sudan Vision, it is important first to explain the knotty historical factors that necessitated its creation. Essentially, this north-south divide is traceable to the oppression Southern Sudanese endured from Arab slave merchants, the Ottoman rule (Turkiyya) and the Mahdi’s occupation (Mahdiyya) (Ronen 2002; Rolandsen and Daly 2016). Under the above oppressive regimes, the Africans in Sudan (north and south) lived a peripheral existence within the Sudanese society. Arguably, the Arabs and the European
colonialists equated “blackness” with inferiority so “blackness” had “servile connotations” (Sharkey 2008: 21). In the global European context, the British colonialists considered Southern Sudanese inferior and geopolitically unimportant so they educated the Arabs and ignored the Africans. As Sharkey has argued, “the British cultivated a group of men [Arab Sudanese] who had the literacy and the political know-how to develop and articulate nationalist ideologies” (2008: 30). Judged religiously against Islam and culturally against Arabism, the Africans in Sudan, especially those in the South, were therefore administered with patronage as culturally inferior (Albino 1970; Yangu 1966). The Turks, Egyptians and the British considered Northerners superior to Southerners. As Mayo (1994: 166) has argued, “The Sudanese problems go far beyond the epoch of the European intrusion.” This is important to note because Arab Sudanese intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders argue that the racial and religious problems in Sudan started with the colonial policies, especially the “Southern Policy” (Mayo 1994; Rahim 1966). For many Northerners, the Africans in Sudan would have embraced Islam and adopt Arabism as their culture had the British not initiated the “Southern Policy.”

However, for Southerners, “Southern Policy” offered a relief against Arab disdain and slavery (Albino 1970; Mayo 1994; Yangu 1966). The policy also hinted at a possible separate “Negroid” nation state or Southern Sudan’s annexation to East Africa (Holt 1956: 370; Ronen 2002: 105). “The policy of the government in Southern Sudan,” said the policy, “is to build up a series of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization based... upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” (Albino 1970: 19). While there was a colonial and imperial intent disguised by the policy (Rahim 1966; Mayo 1994; Ronen 2002) in the assumed protectiveness of the policy against cultural and religious influence from the North, Southern Sudanese welcomed the policy as a safeguard against cultural influence and slavery. Unfortunately, the Anglo-Egyptian government in Sudan would ignore Southerners in administrative posts, education and development because of the above-mentioned attitude (Oduho and Deng 1963: 13). As Fabian Colonial Bureau wrote in 1947, “Educated Sudanese regard the South as Egypt regards them” (Oduho and Deng 1963: 17).
By 1946, however, the British had overturned the Southern policy as Northerners (Mayo 1994; Rahim 1966) decried it as divisive so they pressured the Anglo-Egyptian government against the policy (Albino 1970, 23). This meant that the Southerners’ then hope that they could be separated from the North and annexed to the non-Arab Africa was abandoned (Rahim 1966: 230). So, wary of a possible subjugation in an independent Sudan controlled by bourgeois Arabo-Islamic elite, Southerners first asked for something resembling self-determination during the 1947 Juba Round-Table Conference and a possible independence after a period of British tutelage. When their request was rejected, they asked for a federated system within Sudan between 1948 and 1955 with safeguards against Arabs’ domination (Albino 1970; Johnson 2003; Yangu 1966). The safeguards were of course promised in December of 1955. However, after independence, Prime Minister El-Azhari and his National Unionist Party (NUP) refused to adhere to the promises. Following the premature independence of Sudan in January 1956, the ruling Arab Islamists indigenised the assumed inferiority of Africans in Sudan by marginalising African cultures and religions in the Sudanese institutions and the transitional constitution. The independence was “premature” because the mutiny of the August 18, 1955 complicated pre-arranged issues of independence, which the British no longer wanted to deal with (Johnson 2003). As Johnson (2003: 29) has noted, the independence date was “moved forward” with many “issues of nationhood” unresolved. Not until May 1973 would Sudan get a permanent constitution (Scott 1985). As Sconyers (1988) has shown in a telling article (“Hurrying Home”), British officials of the Sudan Political Service were worried about Sudanisation and “haste” to independence. As one official put it, “We do appreciate the dangers of a too-rapid handover. The tragedy is that our masters do not” (Sconyers 1988: 70). Another official said that “This sudden change of horses in midstream could not but be detrimental to the Province administration” in the South (Sconyers 1988: 67). For the British, this was, in the words of Holt (1956: 376) “the unforeseen acceleration of self-government.”

This “haste” to independence would widen the rift between Northerners and Southerners. During constitutional debates in 1951, 1956 and 1958, the Southerners request for a federal constitution was rejected (Alier 1990) in favour of a unitary Islamic constitution. In fact, Northerners would accept nothing short of an Islamic constitution.
from 1948 to the present day. As John Garang would argue decades later, “the problem is the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of the other parameters of the Sudanese diversity, as constituting the fundamental problem of the Sudan and defining the Sudanese conflict” (Kuka 2011 [2004]). Joseph Lagu, who signed an Agreement with the Sudanese government in 1972, said something similar after ratifying the Addis Ababa agreement. For Lagu, Southerners were not separatists (Beshir 1975). “We took arms and we fought for equality. We didn’t like them to force on us their cultures, their Arab values (RossChild 2017 [1972]). He added that Southerners do not condemn Arabs’ values. According to Garang (Kuku 2011 [2004]), this led to the exclusion of African Sudanese “from governance” where they “are marginalized in the political, economic, and social fields.” Lagu’s and Garang’s concerns are confirmed by Yangu (1966: 56), who argues that “Social attitudes are far more important than laws in running the government.”

As independence neared, Southerners became increasingly wary. Azhari’s Sudanization, which Southerners saw as an occupation of Southern Sudan (Yangu 1966), began after the self-government Act (Broadbent 1954) and gave most of the senior public service jobs in the South to Arab Sudanese instead of to Southern Sudanese. With no Southerners in the Sudanization Committee, only four junior positions, out of 800, went to Southerners (Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963; Yangu 1966). To Southerners, Sudanization was therefore a clear sociopolitical and socioeconomic signal that independence would only be a change of masters (Alier 1990; Yangu 1966). The fair deal (Johnson 2015) or safeguards (Albino 1970; Johnson 2015; Alier 1990) promised to Southerners disappeared after independence. For example, the Abboud government “would not tolerate politicians who uttered such evil word as federation” (Albino 1970: 45). “Southerners,” Alier (1990: 23) said, “either went to jail or chose a life in exile for supporting federal principles.”

Accordingly, the Torit mutiny by the Equatorial Corps on 18 August 1955 was an expression of frustration against the Arabisation of the Sudan in the guise of Sudanisation. Yet, despite Khartoum’s attitude and oppressive policies, Southerners remained open to peaceful resolutions. Notwithstanding their personal and ideological differences and weaknesses, which were obviously there,
Southerners were very logical and understanding in their political and constitutional demands in Sudan. In their demands, Southerners were not dogmatic or uncompromising. They were accommodating: if not A then B; but if not A and B then C. Arab Sudanese on the other hand were less accommodating: A and only A.

During the 1947 Juba Round-Table conference, Southern delegates asked for time to catch up with the north before they considered unity. They were always wary of Northerners’ attitude and history of slavery so they asked for safeguards. However, throughout the conference, their views changed as many of their queries were addressed and confusing ideas clarified. This contradicted Mohammed Shingeitti’s claim at the conference that “Southern Members present came with fixed ideas which they had conceived before the Conference began” (Malok 2009: 301). Southerners’ administrative, political, and economic demands were dictated by the fear of a possible Arab domination so the request for safeguards in the 1947 conference is informative. The acceptance of sending Southerners to Khartoum to be part of the “Legislative assembly” instead of setting up a “Southern Advisory Council,” like the one the North had had for four years was based on the protection of Southern rights. According to Clement Mboro, a legislative assembly could make laws that are binding but an advisory council could not so it was better for the Southerners to be part of the Legislative body to be part of law making (Malok 2009: 306). Like other Southern delegates, Mboro at first had preferred a separate Southern Advisory Council before Southerners joined the Legislative council. His views changed after much thought and what seems to have been an assurance from the northern delegates as well as the chairman of the conference.

Like Southern politicians between 1947 and 1958, Garang too valued inclusiveness. He envisioned a Sudan that “recognizes the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity of Sudan and calls for a new, uniquely Sudanese identity that acknowledges all of this diversity in Sudan” (Delaney 2010: 3). As Garang said in 1990 in Itang Refugee Camp, Ethiopia, “You cannot build a great viable country based on sectarianism. It brings enmity and conflict” (Dut Mathiang 2018). Mr. George Bredin, a former British official in the Blue Nile Province, also warned about this: “A nation is not created by a subordination of minorities into a uniformity of language, culture and practice” (in Nigumi 1958: 116).
By 1960, with no room for political debates and when the persecution of intellectuals and politicians scaled up (Johnson 2003; Yangu 1966; Alier 1990), Southern Sudanese opted for a politico-military expression of their grievances. Fighting for an independent South Sudan, therefore, would become the sacrosanct desire of generations from 1955 on. It fueled what Young (2005: 538) calls “The natural proclivity of southerners to support self-determination.” This of course did not mean that Southerners were completely done with a united Sudan if it was under favourable conditions. Nor did it mean that Southerners were of the same opinion regarding unity, federalism or separatism. However, the atrocious nature of the successive Khartoum governments united Southerners (Albino 1970; Yangu 1966). This led Southern politicians in 1963 to “demand nothing short of self-determination” (Oduho and Deng 1963: 60). The formation of Anyanya 1 in 1963 and the civil war it waged from 1963 to 1972 (Johnson 2016; Rolandsen and Daly 2016; Rolandsen 2011; Yangu 1966; Ronen 2002: 105), would only expose Southern Sudanese civilians, intellectuals and students to the religious fundamentalism and military brutality disguised as “maintaining security” (Alier 1990; Johnson 2015; Albino 1970).

Repression and marginalisation would continue from 1955 – the start of disturbances (Johnson 2016) not the actual civil war – to 1969. When Nimeiri overthrew the beleaguered government of Sadiq El Mahdi in May 1969, his administration explored possible avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Nimeiri would eventually sign an agreement with the Southern rebels. Nevertheless, like any agreement with the Northerners, some Southerners were skeptical. Joseph Lagu, then the political and military leader of the Southern liberation Movement said in a solemn and unenthusiastic monotone after ratifying the agreement in 1972 that “to my opinion, the agreement is satisfactory” (RossChild 2017). However, Lagu’s forces were not that optimistic about the agreement. “We would not believe until it is implemented of course,” one officer told an Associated Press reporter in March 1972. “It all comes out from the implementation,” another officer added (AP Archive 2015 [1972]). However, skepticisms when it comes to North-South agreements and promises are notoriously historical. “The [Arab] younger generation claim that they mean no harm,” warned Chief Lolik Lado in 1947, “but time would show what they would in fact do” (Malok 2009: 302). Other prominent figures like Joseph Oduho,
Aggrey Jaden, Gordon Muortat, young John Garang, and other exiled politicians, were also skeptical of the 1972 agreement (Malok 2009) because of the Arabs’ historical attitude Chief Lado had invoked in 1947. After John Garang heard that Lagu was planning to negotiate with Nimeiri (Alier 1990), he wrote to Joseph Lagu on 24 January 1972: “We must not be tricked into committing suicide to lay down our instruments of liberation, arms ...” (Garang 1972). Gordon Muortat Mayen, who had been a minister in Sudan and previously the head of the Nile Provisional Government (NPG) before Lagu’s “bloodless coup” (Poggo 2009: 129; Malok 2009) or “displacement” (Johnson 2014: 17), cautioned Southerners on 2 March 1972 against any rush, which he saw as “unnecessary hasty action” (Mayen 1972: 1):

because many agreements, reached in the past between the Arabs and the South were always dishonoured by the Arabs ... a way is to be found this time to ensure that whatever agreement is reached, must be implemented and not again violated in the future. (Mayen 1972: 1)

It is this historical skepticism that made Kasfir (1977) write about the Addis Ababa Agreement,

that judgment must remain in doubt for some time. Many difficulties make its continuation precarious. And both pervasive suspicion and a few scattered violent incidents serve as reminders that civil wars, like Gordian knots, cannot be entirely resolved by a single dramatic gesture. (Kasfir 1977: 143)

Because of this historical skepticism, Both Diu told Northern delegates during the 1947 Juba Round-Table conference “that Northerners claim to have no desire to dominate the South, but this was not enough and there must be safeguards” (Malok 2009: 302). Lawrence Wol Wol, a prominent politician during the Anyanya war, prophetically gave the Addis Ababa agreement ten years to hold (Malok 2009: 138–139). Like Lado and Diu, Garang, Wol and Muortat would be proven right. Nimeiri would violate the agreement and declare Sharia law all over Sudan on 8 September 1983 (Sherman 1989: 292; Shinn 2004: 254). It is the unchanging attitude that made Yangu (1966: 52) warn that “North and South cannot, will not, live together. To think otherwise is simply naïve.” Moreover, for Mayo, “Sudan in its form cannot
exist: undoubtedly, it will be divided into Arab-Islamic, and African countries” (Mayo 1994: 182). Such ominous warnings made Garang say in London in March 2002 that the SPLM/A was calling for a “new political dispensation” that would “entail the immediate abolition of the existing situation and the immediate and complete restructuring of the Sudan” (Askou100 2014). Given the history outlined above, it is this “restructuring” that Garang would call the New Sudan Vision.

**The New Sudan Vision (NSV)**

New Sudan, a reconfigured Sudan under an inclusive, new political dispensation, changed between 1983 and 1991, as we will see below. This made it confusing and Garang knew this. As he said in a 2004 speech in the US, “I am aware that the New Sudan has been criticized by some people in the past as utopian, that it is wishful thinking. This is because New Sudan has several dimensions” (Kuka 2011 [2004]). Garang, of course, knew the deep-seated separatist sentiment among Southern Sudanese; however, he also knew that making separatism the rallying cry for the rights of Southern Sudanese would not win SPLM/A support, especially from Ethiopia (Johnson 2003; Nyaba 1997). In this regard, he appealed to Southerners by arguing that the unity of Sudan the SPLM/A was fighting for would be a unity on a new basis (Kuka 2011[2004]). As he put it in 2002 in London, “Why would I be interested in a United Sudan that discriminates me?” (Askou100 2014). During the 1994 SPLM/A national convention, Garang (1994: 28) warned against being a “self-styled Southern Separatist”; however, he acknowledged that “Some of them [separatists] are genuine.” A new strategy was therefore necessary. Moreover, this new strategy had to also appeal to Northerners (Arabs and Africans), the region, Africa, and the international community. The appeal to Northerners and the international community was meant to give the new Movement a global legitimacy. However, the appeal to Southern Sudanese was more important than the appeal to Northerners and the international community, because without the Southern fighting force, the SPLM/A would have been a mere political and linguistic game. Since Southern Sudanese had endured the brutality and marginalisation of successive Arab regimes, as has been shown in the preceding section, Garang had to assuage their fears while making the SPLM appeal beyond the borders of Southern Sudan and Sudan as a whole.
Therefore, Garang and the SPLM/A leadership tried to balance this complex equation in the years leading up to the Bor Mutiny of 1983 and the founding of the SPLM/A. Garang was of course skeptical of the Addis Ababa agreement as mentioned above so, it was easy for him to exploit the Southern anxiety about Nimeiri’s capricious leadership. By September 1983, Nimeiri declared Sharia “the law of the land” (Sharkey 2008: 36), divided the South into three administrative regions [Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal & Equatoria] and thereby unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement. For Southerners, it was a *déjà vu* all over again. Peaceful means of ensuring the rights and the dignity of the Southern Sudanese was no longer an option, again. Anyanya 2, made up of remnants of Anyanya 1 and some mutineers of 1975 (Akobo), 1976 (Wau), in 1977 (Juba) (Johnson 2016; Shinn 2004; Alier 1990) was already fighting Khartoum. John Garang, now a colonel in the Sudanese army, and other members of an underground movement (Madut-Arop 1987; Igga 2008), flocked to Ethiopia to unite the aggrieved Southern consciousness against Nimeiri. As Garang told Arop Madut-Arop, then the editor of Khartoum-based *Heritage Newspaper*, “We were not only in contacts, we were active ... during the ten years between 1972–1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution” (Madut-Arop 1987).

When Garang and his army colleagues went to Ethiopia after the failure of the planned internal revolution (Leriche and Arnold 2013; Collins 2008; Scott 1984), they knew that uniting all Southern forces against Khartoum was a priority. According to Robert Collins (2008: 142), these forces included defecters of battalions 104 and 105 as well as deserters from Anyanya 2 and other security services. Garang corroborated this in his interview with Madut-Arop: “Our immediate task after we formed the SPLM/SPLA was to try to regroup the scattered fighting forces that we found, politicise them, win their confidence and make them organic to the SPLA” (Madut-Arop 1987). Garang repeated this in 1994: “In the beginning it was necessary to unite all the various fighting guerrilla units in the Bush of Southern Sudan with insurgent forces of Battalions 104, 105...” (Garang 1994: 21).

Unfortunately, uniting these forces would not be easy as personal and ideological differences between unity and separatism collided. After the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983, older politicians like Akuot Atem de Mayen, Abdallah Chuol and Gai Tut wanted the Movement
to fight for an independent Southern Sudan (Nyaba 1997; Alier 1990; SPLM Manifesto 2008). Garang and his followers wanted to fight for a united, Socialist Sudan. Garang has always openly expressed his objection to secessionism as he emphasised to Madut-Arop (1987):

Before I joined the Anya Nya Movement, I went to the camp of General Joseph Lagu, the Commander of the Anya Nya to brief me about the objectives of his Movement. From his briefings it was clear that his Movement was a separatist movement. I told him point blank that I was opposed to secession movements.

Whether Garang was a unionist or a separatist is open to debate because there are instances in which his separatism or unionism can be dismissed or supported. However, that he was an excellent strategist is unquestionable. Knowing that Mengistu was already fighting a separatist movement in Eritrea, Garang understood that the SPLM/A could not style itself as separatist. In the end, Garang won as Mengistu supported a united, Secular and Socialist Sudan as this was in line with Mengistu’s domestic military plans and ideological base (Bayissa 2007). The July 1983 SPLM/A Manifesto was largely a polemical socialist propaganda in both its language and its content. It outlined what the SPLM/A was fighting for: a “socialist transformation” of Sudan (SPLM/A Manifesto 1983: 16).

Notably, the manifesto is the only official ideological reference document of the SPLM/A. The SPLA Penal Code document (Malok 1990; SPLM 1994) instead, is a judicial not an ideological document. In lieu of any other official Movement’s ideological document, it is therefore reasonable to argue that the manifesto contains the Movement’s political ideology: socialism. As Malok (2009) has argued, the SPLM/A was a socialist Movement between 1983 and 1994. There has been doubts about the socialist claims of the SPLM/A since none of the top SPLM/A leaders was ideologically a professed socialist before 1983 (Madut-Arop 2006). The Sudanese communist party, too, doubted SPLM/A socialist leaning in the manifesto (Madut-Arop 2006; Alier 1990). Nonetheless, the manifesto portrayed socialism as the structuring value system. Garang referred to the manifesto by waiving it up when speaking to conscripts from the Southern Blue Nile in the mid-1980s (SudaneseOnline 2012). He also referenced to it in his opening speech during the first SPLM/A National Convention
(Garang 1994). In that convention speech, he argued that the objective as spelled out in the manifesto was “the complete destruction of the oppressive Jellaba regime.” He added that “Nothing can change this cardinal objective unless one means to surrender” (Garang 1994: 19). In his speech to the conscripts from the Southern Blue Nile, he reiterated that “We will not veer away from these goals/objectives” (SudaneseOnline 2012).

In the words of the Manifesto, the “cardinal” objective of the SPLA “is ... to establish a united Socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan.” Since “New Sudan” does not appear in the 1983 manifesto, it is this “united Socialist Sudan” that has become the “New Sudan” as chapter one of the First SPLM/A convention announced “the birth of New Sudan” (SPLM 1994: 1). Consequently, the establishment of this kind of “Sudan” would be the “Vision” of the SPLM/A. In social and political substance, principally, the New Sudan would be multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural and democratic. This is a Sudan “in which all nationalities and all the religious groups coexist” (Khalid 1992: 213). As Garang said in 2004 (Kuka 2011 [2004]), it is “A New Sudan that belongs to all of us equally in which we are equally stakeholders.” As he told Novicki of Africa Report (1989), this “New Sudan” would be opposed to “a multi-nationality in which one of the nationalities poses and imposes itself as the only nationality with history and culture and goes to the absurd unnatural extent to force the other nationalities to convert.”

Undoubtedly, an inclusive “New Sudan” appealed to the marginalised people of Sudan (Malok 2009; Igga 2008). It experientially spoke to them as shown by a letter from Nuba people to the SPLM/A on 9 July 1992, arguing that the objectives of “united, democratic and secular Sudan ... earned support of the Nuba people” (Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad 1992). This appeal was a result of the SPLA propaganda machinery since its inception (Scott 1984; Sharkey 2008; Malok 2009). As a result, the SPLM/A offered frontage socialist training to its officers in their cadet “political school” (Madut-Arop 2006; Malok 2009). My father was one of those trained in those “political schools.” Even “red army”—between 10 and 15 years of age—in Panyidu Refugee Camp, Ethiopia, were indoctrinated into socialist, Marxist and revolutionary ideas:
1. New Sudan is of equality. We need it through justice. We need it through justice. New Sudan of equality (Deng Dengdit 2011).

2. Sadiq [Mahdi], you are a bourgeoisie; [Lawrence] Wol Wol, you are a bourgeoisie. SPLA has a bayonet ... the one who is affected by mosquito, thirst and hunger is the one liberating the country. Our land, we will liberate it by blood (BlueNile98 2014).

It is unlikely that these young people, like many SPLA soldiers, understood the complexities of the “New Sudan.” As Garang talked of an inclusive Sudan, some soldiers were telling Nimeiri and Sadiq to “go back to Gezira” in the Middle East.

The evolution of the vision of a socialist Sudan over time made it even more confusing. As Dor (2016: 54) put it, “The New Sudan vision was both a political ideology and a method, as well as an objective of the struggle.” Garang (Askou100 2014 [2002]) has reiterated this: “We have presented this vision as both a strategy, method, tactics of a struggle.” This certainly affects the coherence of NSV.

From the theoretical framework outlined above, I can say that NSV is a body of ideas and it has a method through which it was intended to restructure Sudan’s value system. As a result, I can answer the first question posed above in the affirmative: NSV was a [political] ideology. In addition, this ideology calls for an inclusive Sudan in which no single religion or ethnicity (or race) dominates. All social groups would share equally in governance, wealth and cultural expression. As Alfred Akuoc said in 1984, people will “no longer be referred to as Northerners, Southerners, Easterners, or Westerners, but Sudanese” (Scott 1984: 72, emphasis in the original). Mayo concluded his article about the unity of Sudan under favourable conditions in the same manner: “everyone will call himself or herself Sudanese – no Arab Muslim, no African-Christian, but Sudanese“ (Mayo 1994: 1983, emphasis in original).

Given my preceding concession above that SPLM is a political ideology, I can agree with Athian, Deng and Thuch and Deng as quoted that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had a political ideology. But that

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4 Quotation 1 is a translation from Arabic of a local jazz song in the Itang refugee camp; quotation 2 was translated from Dinka by the author from Panyidu refugee camp “red army” songs.
is only part of the problem. While the New Sudan Vision was what Garang claimed as the core of what the SPLM/A was fighting for, it is still doubtful that NSV was incontrovertibly the full Movement’s ideology.

**SPLM/A and the Question of Political Ideology**

While John Garang as the Movement’s leader, the architect of the SPLM’s ideological and policy direction, and the main promoter of NSV seemed to have convinced South Sudanese and the SPLM leadership to embrace NSV, the facts shown below do not support such a conclusion. Even when Garang promoted the NSV over an independent South Sudan, he was not blind to the strong separatist sentiment and its rationale in the South given the history of oppression we encountered above. Gordon Muortat Mayen of the separatist Nile Provisional Government (NPG) was a staunch separatist (Gidron 2018); however, he welcomed Garang and his delegation to London in 2002 by saying that “on behalf of the new Sudan community in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, we welcome you and your delegation” (Askou100 2014, emphasis added). Like Southern separatism, Garang’s unionist stance has always been conditional on Khartoum’s attitude and on external, global realities (Malok 2009):

> [why] should I remain in a country where I am called abeed [slave]? No, I will not. But then let us take the bull by the horns and change the Sudan so that it belongs to all of us; so that it remains united. (Kuka 2011 [2004])

Accordingly, a united Sudan under favourable sociopolitical conditions has always been Garang’s first choice in his Five-Model governance structure (Askou100 2014 [2002]; Deng 2013: 165). Nevertheless, for Southerners including some SPLM/A officials, a united Sudan under new conditions as Garang put it was acceptable. However, an independent nation state has always been the Southern first choice followed by federalism. The splits within the Movement in 1983 and 1991 concerned disagreements from liberation figures who saw “New Sudan” as a lofty ideal (Lam 2003: 306; Deng 2010). As Dor (2017: 54) succinctly put it, the NSV “created internal rifts within the leadership and amongst the southern populations concerned only with independence for Southern Sudan from the North.” However,
on the surface, those who joined the SPLM/A seem to have accepted the idea of fighting for a united, changed Sudan. SPLA revolutionary songs were based on this total liberation of the Sudan.

a: “The Locust battalion wants to liberate Sudan as a whole.”

b: “It’s better we died because the land is ours” (Nhial81 2008).

c: “The division of Sudan is the problem to us. You deceived Anyanya 1; you deceived those of Gai Tut. You will no longer deceive SPLA, because it has a problem” (BlueNile94 2014).

In retrospect, SPLM/A publications such as SPLM/A Update and the radio SPLA can be reasonably rationalised as mouthpieces of Garang. As Malok (2009) and Nyaba (1997) have argued, the SPLM/A became synonymous with John Garang. However, their messages featured as the Movement’s revolutionary communications because they played the intended role of the Movement’s propaganda. So how can this be proven?

Collins and Daly (2016: 142) have argued that Garang “was the undisputed leader of SPLM/A, its chief ideologue, orator, decision-maker, negotiator and diplomat.” Lam Akol and Riek Machar, in their “Nasir Declaration,” argued that Garang “is the director of Radio SPLA as well as its news director. Any contribution to the radio must be sanctioned by him personally” (Akol 2003: 308). While Machar’s and Akol’s claim sounds like an exaggeration, it is important to note that SPLA military and leadership directives were never critically discussed (see Kerubino’s letter in Igga 2008). Garang strategised and sent them “to all units.” There was no debate on his decisions and neither did he, in most cases, consult the High Command. Kerubino Kuanyin (Igga 2008), William Nyuon (Akol 2003) and Salva Kiir in 1987, 1992 and 2004, respectively, complained about how Garang ran the Movement without consulting them even when they were his second in command. Kiir’s criticism of Garang in Rumbek in 2004 is revealing: “When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?”

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5 Selections of lines from various SPLA songs: a and b were translated from Dinka (Jiëëŋ) by the author from Muormuor battalion songs; c was translated by the author from “red army” Panyidu Dinka songs.
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(Sudan Tribune 2008). During his plan to oust Garang, Nyuon called him a “monster” (Akol 2003: 135). Kerubino accused Garang in a 1987 letter that “the affairs of the Movement are being single handedly run by him [Garang]” (Igga 2008: 241). I therefore find it reasonable to remain skeptical of the popular reception of the NSV among Southern Sudanese and SPLM/A officials.

The SPLM, in its revised manifesto, and which for the first time included “the vision of New Sudan,” acknowledged these internal contradictions of the separatist-unionist dyad: “Some leaders of the SPLM [sic] and some Anya-Nya Commanders decided to leave the Movement because they wanted to fight for an independent Southern Sudan and not for a New Sudan” (SPLM Manifesto 2008: 11).

With these internal differences and lack of free political debate within the SPLM/A, the acceptance of united Socialist Sudan and later the “New Sudan” were either out of fear or out of ignorance. Akol (2003), Nyaba (1997), Malok (2009) have highlighted this repressive politico-military culture in the SPLA prior to 1991. Thus, fighting for a united Sudan was a conditional acceptance of unionism by staunch separatists as a survivalist imperative. As Dor (2017: 155) has argued, “New Sudan vision was not thereafter consistently shared by all in the Movement.” It is therefore reasonable to conclude that separatism remained latent. Essentially, NSV was not an ideal that had found a foothold among Southerners and in the SPLM/A. A majority of the SPLA infantry was not educated enough to understand the complexities of a “united socialist and secular Sudan” and those who understood it but wanted a separate Southern Sudan had to embrace it for expediency. However, that the NSV did rally Sudanese and more so, Southern Sudanese, is undeniable. Dor (2017: 192) underscores this: “Unlike Anyanya the SPLM/A became a melting pot for all of Sudan and, for the first time, many different groups were able to identify with a shared national objective.”

Even though the core idea of “New Sudan” remained the same, many details changed and became complex between 1994 and 2005. The SPLM Manifesto (2008: 3) noted this: “the vision itself has become more sharpened and enriched by the unfolding developments and events in the process.” NSV went from a simple sociopolitical and
socioeconomic revolutionary concept for a nation state to a complex intellectual and futuristic utopia.

We have articulated the objective of the SPLM/SPLA in global terms in what we have termed the double apartheid political system of the Sudan and [the] establishment of a New Sudan. A new Sudanese political dispensation, that is based on the Sudanese reality as defined in the general mathematical equation of \( S = (X, Y, Z) \) instead of the two parameters of Arabism and Islamism. (Askou100 2014 [2002])

The vision of a New Sudan continued to grow in intellectual sophistication; however, Garang did not help the Movement’s leadership to grow intellectually with the vision. Until the 1994 SPLM/A convention in Chukudum, collective decision-making and free debate about SPLM/A policies and directives within the PMHC were not subject to debate. Garang dictated what happened in the Movement so the united Sudan or New Sudan was his imposition on the people. Some of those who rejected “New Sudan” where either killed or were forced to sign an agreement with Garang and involuntarily join the “New Sudan” slogan.

Nonetheless, there is enough conceptual and rational ground to argue that NSV was an ideology even though the SPLM/A (Manifesto 2008: 3) itself rejected the categorisation of NSV as an ideology: “The New Sudan Vision is not by any means a dogma, nor is it a doctrine or ideology!” Garang, of course, contradicted this rejection of NSV as an ideology: “I have made it very clear before that our vision, our ideology of society is that we are all Sudanese” ((Kuka 2011 [2004]), emphasis added). Essentially, NSV features well as a “body of ideas,” a “set of beliefs,” and a “system of ideas.” And for the majority, accepted voluntarily or involuntarily for some time, NSV was a “shared framework of mental models.” However, that NSV was the Movement’s ideology will remain controversial and wanting of proof. There are historical and administrative reasons why NSV as a SPLM/A political ideology is questionable, as will be recounted below.

Unlike the “United Socialist Sudan,” NSV does not appear in the 1983 SPLM/A Manifesto. As Bayissa (2007: 23) has argued, the leaders “prepared a manifesto of the movement and declared socialism to be
their ideology.” The development of NSV in all its sophistication has no such collective development and incorporation. Deng (2013: 114) argues that critics should critically read the 1983 manifesto. He argues that Garang’s 1972 letter contains “New Sudan” so it should be read as “the central premise of the manifesto.” This, unfortunately, makes NSV Garang’s ideology rather than the Movement’s.

The masses in Southern Sudan were not educated to understand the complexities of NSV as some soldiers joined the Movement to get guns in order to fight their traditional, tribal enemies not Khartoum (Bayissa 2007: 31). There was also no free political atmosphere in which a voluntary acceptance of the vision could have taken place. Additionally, the split within the Movement in 1983 and 1991, and the immediate death of NSV in Southern Sudan immediately after Garang had died, speaks about the superficiality of NSV in the consciousness of South Sudanese and the southern SPLM. After he had become chairman of the SPLM/A, Salva Kiir focused his attention on the referendum, as Hilde Johnson (2016) has noted. Those who were close to Garang were sidelined (Nyaba 2016; Johnson F 2016). Admittedly, the Sudanese April revolution has seen an increased call for Garang’s NSV by Sudanese and some South Sudanese. However, the call for NSV is a touchy subject among South Sudanese as NSV is officially dead in South Sudan given the history explained above. However, that NSV can still be implemented in Sudan is a possibility I cannot deny, given the inclusive nature of the revolution and the fact that the current Sudanese Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, is a “true pan-Africanist” (ECA 2018).

Moreover, that a political ideology of a Movement can only be understood in the speeches of the leader and not in the Movement’s official documents affects the argument that NSV was the SPLM/A political ideology. The Movement’s socialist and militarist orientations were opportunistic, not populist like Southern separatist consciousness, because of the SPLM/A need for military support from Ethiopia. Mengistu preferred socialism because of Ethiopian-Soviet relations and militarism in order to use the SPLM/A against domestic secessionist movements, as Bayissa shows on the basis of Ethiopia’s ministry of defense archival documents. The movement’s founding was a direct project of Ethiopia ministry of defense, called “07 project” (2007: 29).
Essentially, senior SPLM/A leaders, except for a few like Mansur Khalid, cannot explain NSV in all its complexity in a manner commensurate with Garang’s intellectual vigour. Lual Deng (2013) is the only one who has attempted to analyse it. Superficially, a majority in the Movement’s leadership understood it as a quest for an inclusive, united and secular Sudan. However, NSV as a complex mathematical definition (or set of equations) of Sudan remains a preserve of Garang. As Deng argues, “Not many people in the SPLM understood this equation” (2013: 29–30, see note 7). Admittedly, an ideology can be modified or abandoned with time (van Dijk 1998); however, NSV did not just die, it died swiftly. The ascendancy of Kiir Mayardit as the chairman of the SPLM and the president of the autonomous government in Southern Sudan in Juba struck the final nail in the NSV coffin because Kiir was a self-identified separatist (Young 2005). SPLM, while it still claimed to adhere to its NSV, did little in praxis to make sure that Garang’s NSV was achieved. As Lam has argued, SPLM/A did not try to evangelise the gospel of NSV. Perhaps what the SPLM/A expected for NSV to attain the political ideological status or epistemic foothold as “shared values” or “shared national objective,” as Dor (2017: 192) says, was what Max Borders (2018) calls “trickle-down ideology.” So Garang and the SPLM/A assumed that NSV “would trickle down, like a combustible liquid, into the minds of those who would eventually become adherents or evangelists.”

After Garang’s demise in July 2005, there was an implicit but, at times, explicit move toward separatism in the South. “The entire system that has continued to underpin the Sudanese state from the dawn of independence,” said President Kiir during his swearing in ceremony in May 2010, “continues today and is presently at an advanced stage of rotting completely” (Wheeler 2010). This was an implicit reference to the inevitability of the Southern secession. Kiir too resented Northern opposition figures, who he believed wanted to assent to power “on the back of Southerners” (Young 2005: 546). But as Garang ironically said derogatorily against Anyanya 1, a compromise is tantamount to failure

6 [S (Sudan) = (XYZ)] is Sudan defined by different factors (X, Y, Z... ) as opposed to just two: Arabism and Islamism. Garang’s other definitional equation is [F (NS) = AS +PU+PD+PA+PT]. The second equation is how NSV would be achieved: New Sudan (NS), the dependent variable, is a function of Armed Struggle (AS), Popular Uprising (PU), Peace through Development (PD), International Diplomacy (IP), Political Alliance (PA) and Peace Talks (PT) (See Deng 2013).
in one’s goal (Novicki 1989). Logically, then, SPLM/A compromised its vision in 2005, but mostly in 1992 Abuja 1 and in 1994 IGAD’s DOPs in Nairobi when it prominently incorporated the right of self-determination (LeRiche and Arnold 2013; Breidlid 2014) that would later divide the country and irreversibly bury the NSV.

Undoubtedly, the constant paradigm shift, as Nyaba would call it, was either a function of the SPLM/A inability or Garang’s reluctance to institutionalise power and decision-making. Procedure, instead, concentrated power and decision-making in the hands of an all-powerful SPLM/A chairman: Garang, then later Kiir just like their then patron, Mengistu’s autocracy (Bayissa 2007: 28). Consequently, the Movement promoted military discipline and routine instead (Nyaba 1997), which is “the militarist trend the Ethiopian regime had wanted the infant movement to follow” (Bayissa 2007: 28). This means the value system that structured the SPLM/A was militaristic rather than political (Nyaba 1997) and that would be a legacy that would hinder the development of political ideology and its institutionalization. As Dor correctly put it, “SPLM/A remained a military Movement during the conflict while its political organisation was never properly institutionalized” (2017: 54).

So, the SPLM/A’s shift from socialism as the initial political ideology, and the move to NSV (SPLM 1994) as the Movement’s ideology, makes it difficult to understand what the Movement’s ideology was. Logically, the loosely and unofficially adopted NSV was an incoherent, strategic value system that favoured a militaristic modus operandi instead of a clear political structuring of the Movement to collectively sensitise the civil population on a “shared path” required by ideology. According to Malok (2009), who ironically believed that “New Sudan was clear, straight forward and unambiguous,” the SPLM/A became a revolutionary Movement in 1994 when it developed non-military political and administrative structures. Even after 1994, contrary to Malok’s claim, “New Sudan” remained ambiguous.

At first, the NSV was a fight to liberate the whole Sudan. But in some cases, “New Sudan” was Southern Sudan as is shown in the SPLM/A Leadership Council meeting (1-4 December 2003 see point number 2.0) resolution.7 Yet, “Southern Sudan is an element of New Sudan”

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7 See the Resolutions of the meeting (SPLM 2003: 1).
In some instances, “New Sudan” was only the liberated areas under SPLM/A. The resolution of the SPLM/A’s first convention said that “New Sudan” was “for the time being ... Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Upper Nile Regions” (SPLM 1994: 1; Garang 1994: 51). Here “New Sudan” is being put together piecemeal. Apparently, wherever the NSV value system applies is the “New Sudan.”

This is where militarism overtakes political realities. The way in which the idea of a “New Sudan” was to be achieved was militaristic rather than political and the value system that informed it was politically impoverished (Nyaba 1997, 2016). SPLM/A’s subordination of the political wing [SPLM] affected the Movement’s structural coherence and internal leadership protocol since its inception. This was manifest in the leadership crises of May 2008, March 2013 and December 2013. The SPLM/A focus on militarism is why SPLM/A-united wrote in a press release on 17 November 1994 about a new policy shift to the “Supremacy of the SPLM over the SPLA” (Lam 2003: 354). As Nyaba (2016: xii) put it, “The lack of political ideology is a disability factor. Ideas unite people and mould them into one organization.” NSV failed to “mould” Southerners into one with the SPLM/A. As Alier (1990: 250) has argued, “Though the SPLM leadership call for one new Sudan, the rank and file of the SPLA might have to turn to wholly different goals.” Nyaba (1997: 41) corroborates this: “While the leadership was talking of a united socialist Sudan, the people were talking of secession of South Sudan.” And the masses of South Sudan did indeed turn to a different goal: independent South Sudan instead of “New Sudan.” Essentially, SPLM/A’s political plan that could have guaranteed the emergence of a coherent political ideology was rather a hypothetical, futuristic transformation of the Sudan without any concurrent political blueprints being put in place. And those put in place in the 1994 convention under the Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS), like the National Liberation Council, were overlooked or replaced (Collins and Daly 2016). Even as First Vice President of Sudan, Garang sometimes neither consulted nor explained some decisions. Garang’s chief of staff, Dr. Cirino Hiteng, and Garang’s close disciple, Dr. Lual Deng, had no clue why Garang placed senior SPLM/A leaders as governors in states that were not their home states (Deng 2013: 191). As Hiteng wrote to Deng, “I have no idea but I know that Dr. John was not going to send governors to their home turfs for fear
of conflict of interest. We definitely missed a lot from his intention” (Deng 2013: 191 in a footnote).

If the chief of staff is not consulted in such a pertinent decision, then who did Garang consult? I therefore answer the second question posed above —”Is NSV the SPLM political ideology?”— negatively. The New Sudan Vision was only conditionally embraced. It had not replaced separatism in the Southern consciousness as seen in the referendum vote. Marginalisation and oppression were too strong for Southerners to believe in an envisioned inclusive Sudan.

Conclusion

Given that Southern Sudanese were fighting against dominance and ideological impositions from Khartoum, it is imperative to understand how ideology relating to the political system in South Sudan is properly presented. It is tempting to assume that the SPLM/A had a political ideology without any critical analysis of what an ideology is and how it relates to the political system within South Sudan and the SPLM especially. While the present article concedes that Garang’s vision of a “new Sudan” can be rationalised as an ideology based on the theoretical framework defined above, it remains doubtful whether NSV was SPLM/A ideology.

First, the Movement’s initial ideology was socialism as presented by the SPLM/A manifesto of 1983 and its aim was a total transformation of the Sudan into a United Socialist Sudan. However, since the inception of the SPLM/A in 1983, the New Sudan Vision was never embraced voluntarily. It divided the leadership and led to internecine bloodbath until the opponents of the NSV were defeated and brought into the fold in an unforgiving militarism. The development of a new socialist Sudan into a shared value system to institute an organisational ideology would never be realised. Disagreement remained latent until 1991 when it led to a bloody division and fratricidal war reminding the world that NSV was not a broadly accepted value system; it was presented as a personal, lofty ideal of Dr. John Garang. Deng (2010: 10) termed NSV “a lofty, but elusive national objective.” As Akol and Machar (Akol 2003: 76) argued in December 1991, “the old policy objective of fighting for the whole Sudan has been discarded as no
longer representative of the true national wishes and aspirations of the people of Southern Sudan.”

In many ways, the New Sudan Vision was never institutionalised and collectivised as the SPLM/A’s ideology and this hastened its death in January 2011 after the referendum (Gallab 2016). But since militarism and authoritarianism were institutionalised within the SPLM/A, they, not the NSV, remained as Garang’s legacy bestowed on the SPLM/A (Young 2005; Gallab 2016). Analysts only understand the New Sudan Vision in Garang’s personal documents or speeches. This hardly makes it an organisational ideology even if ideology definitions make NSV an ideology. There is no document commissioned before 2008, like the Manifesto, that presents the coherence of NSV as the Movement’s and Sudan’s structuring value system. The New Sudan Vision remained a prerogative of John Garang and its adoption by the SPLM/A was by virtue of Garang being the SPLM/A chairman. As Alier (1990: 250) has stated, “SPLM is pledged to oppose anybody within and outside its ranks who attempts to undermine Sudan unity.” As Nyaba (1990: 53) put it, “any critic of the SPLM/A leader was considered a criticism directed against the Movement and vice versa.”

When Dr. John Garang de Mabior died in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005, his New Sudan Vision died instantly in the South. Had NSV been an organisational ideology, there would have been a Movement’s document that espoused it and it would have remained functional long after Garang’s death. Necessary modifications are acceptable; however, a complete and sudden death of an organisational ideology is puzzling.

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