AXING THE RAINBOW: DOES FALLISM RECONFIGURE POST-APARTHEID NATIONHOOD IN SOUTH AFRICA?

Irina Turner

Abstract: Today, the Rainbow Nation as the central metaphor for post-apartheid South Africa falls short of serving as a unifying identification marker due to its tendency to gloss over contrasting living realities of diversified identities and ongoing systemic discrimination. The South African Fallism movements – the student-driven protests against neo-colonial structures in academic institutions – spearheaded public criticism with the current state of ongoing social disparity in South Africa and revived the critique of so-called rainbowism, i.e., the belief that a colour-blind society can be created. In an application of Critical Discourse Analysis focusing on mythical metaphors, this article asks to what extent the new president Cyril Ramaphosa in his maiden State of the Nation Address projected a post-Zuma South African nation and answered to the challenges posed by Fallists.

Keywords: South Africa, national myth, rainbow nation, Ramaphosa, fallism

Introduction: Fallism, Ramaphosa and a shattered Rainbow

Today, the concept of the Rainbow Nation, the central metaphor for post-apartheid South Africa, falls short of serving as a broadly acknowledged identity marker. In essence, the concept’s validity expired due to its implied impetus to downplay the existence of contrasting living realities from diversified identities, thus glossing over sustained systemic discrimination and inequality.

The South African Fallism movement – the student-driven protests peaking in the years 2015 and 2016 against neoliberal and neo-colonial
structures in academic institutions – spearheaded public criticism with the current state of persistent social disparity and economic injustice in South Africa and its rhetoric representation. Through Fallists, a critique of the so-called rainbowism – i.e., of the belief that a colour-blind society can be created – was revived in public discourse1 about the state of the nation.

The present article asks to what extent the new president Cyril Ramaphosa2 reacted to these criticisms in his maiden State of the Nation Address and how he projected a South African nation after Jacob Zuma, who had governed the country from 2009 until 2017 and in the process severely damaged public confidence in government. It might not be immediately evident why Ramaphosa should answer to Fallists in particular in his first state-of-the-nation address. This speech by the head of state traditionally holds a prolific role in nation building and provides a pivotal platform in narrating the nation (Turner 2015: 13f). Such “a speech founds or ‘enstates’ a new possibility for social and political life” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 27). In the past, the dominant narrative had been that as long as South Africans believe in the Rainbow Nation and remain peaceful, established plans and policies would do the rest, so that “just a touch of patience was needed before delivery would reach even more people” (Booysen 2016b: 28). Fallists, who day-to-day experience ongoing inequality (Booysen 2016b: 27), openly challenged both credibility and direction of government in that regard while enjoying broad public support. In that, they symbolise the potential for a new way of governing the country and directly question its ideological outlook. Ramaphosa in turn, as a representative of the 1994 dealmakers and defender of the Rainbow Nation, was personally, morally and politically under pressure to react to the questions raised by his “children” (Booysen 2016b: 37) right

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1 Discourse can be defined as a framework of meaning realised in language and produced by and amongst social institutions (Burman et al. 1997: 8).
2 Before the end of apartheid, Ramaphosa had already been on the list of potential presidents but was side-lined by Thabo Mbeki and subsequently became highly successful in private business (Tabane et al 2009: 150ff). His prominent involvement in the peace negotiations of the 1990s and his eminent role as a chair of the Constitutional Assembly were recognised internationally (Tabane et al 2009: 150ff). As a student, Ramaphosa was part of the radical South African Students’ Organisation (Saso) and the Black People’s Convention and later was a key player in strengthening opposition alliances such as COSATU in the anti-apartheid struggle (Tabane et al. 2009: 150ff).
from the onset of his presidency. While Zuma, as one of his last deeds as president, had partially conceded to the practical demands, it was now up to Ramaphosa to prove whether on an ideological and ethical level government was eye-to-eye with the Fallists.

This explorative study of rhetorics focuses on mythical metaphors in tracing the deconstruction of the Rainbow Nation and its potential decolonised replacement. After outlining the historical emergence of South Africa and the Rainbow Nation, the significance of Fallism for the current and future national discourse is discussed. Subsequently, the deconstruction of the Rainbow Nation as a nation-building concept is traced, starting roughly with the new millennium. In an application of Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g., Bhatia 2006; Reisigl 2006), the main analysis examines the first State of the Nation Address by Cyril Ramaphosa in February 2018 and its references to both Fallists and the Rainbow Nation. In the conclusion, the results are synthesised.

**Doing the Rainbow Nation and the Role of Ethnicity**

In order to understand the symbolic constructedness of the nation, it is important to separate it from the concept of the state (Butler and Spivak 2007: 91). Thinking along with de Saussure (1974), the nation, as a kind of ephemeral sound, is a signifier of the state, i.e., of the signified physical entity which constitutes “the legal and institutional structures that delimit a certain territory” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 3 and 91). Hence, the nation can be linguistically called into being. When the concept of the nation invasively defines the identities of its individual citizens, one can speak of “nationalism”; “an early 19th century invention” which provides a national vision by emphasising “commonness of origins, purposes, and goals that allowed those in power to legitimate rule over large and diverse populations” (Schiller et al. 1992: 14f). In this regard, nationalism is closely tied to a modernist and positivist vision of (industrial) development of which nations are a side product linked to “the colonial venture” (Schiller et al. 1992: 14f). Nationalism emphasises its constructedness “through shared symbolism of an imaginary common interest that may occasionally galvanize rebellion to existing authority” (Schiller et al. 1992: 14f).

As the primary identity myth of the new South Africa, the Rainbow Nation has become somewhat synonymous with the post-apartheid
dispensation (Gqola 2001: 99) and countered older apartheid divisions based upon race (Van Staden 1997: 49). Rather than stating a status quo, the Rainbow Nation has been an “aspirational descriptor” speaking about “how we should relate to one another, what we should be able to assume and invest in one another” (Gqola 2007: 112) [emphasis in original]. In this sense, it stands for nonracialism because “Rainbow Nation rhetoric avoids reference to colour in the sense of race [but] instead the colours are simply said to symbolize the diversity of South Africa’s usually unspecified cultural/ethnic groups” (Baines 1998: 1).

The Rainbow Nation recalls a notion of common South Africanness despite the fact that this concept was originally racially loaded. South Africanism started off as “the expression of a developing settler society, and as such marginalized or denied the rights of indigenous African peoples” (Dubow 2006: vi). It thus stood for the paradox of excluding black people while at the same time it “disavowed the politics of ‘racialism’ […] [and] its proponents professed their commitment to ameliorating tensions between Afrikaners and English-speakers by stressing common bonds of patriotism” (Dubow 2006: vi). From the nineteenth century on, this inclusionary-exclusionary dichotomy accompanied the unfolding idea of South Africa throughout (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 155f).

Four main contending ideas can be identified: (1) an “anti-liberal settler colonialism” loyal to the British crown; (2) the Afrikaner republic; (3) a “liberal civic trajectory,” emerging from the Cape with a strong commitment to a tolerant constitution as well as to economic and social freedom – albeit with an underlying “assumption of English supremacy, patronage and belief in the superiority of Western civilization”; and (4) African counter-conceptions emerging out of the experience of oppression by both the British and Afrikaners, land expulsion and ideological exclusion from “white imaginations of the nation” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 162ff). The 1996 constitution and the post-apartheid state were largely built on the heritage of the latter two, the liberal and African versions of the South African nation; while the issue of land restitution remains unresolved up until today. As ideas of South Africa crystallised, a racist ideology and its active countering became inseparable elements of identity discourses:
“African identity formation emerged concurrently with the intensification of scientific racism [...] used [...] as a powerful legitimating ideology of domination and segregation in early twentieth century South Africa” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 170).

It is worthwhile revisiting black strands of early national identity discourses as they build the foundation of much of the contemporary debates in South Africa today (see Chipkin 2007: 17ff). The liberal trajectory promoted the “inclusion of Africans into the body politic and white nation” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 172). Radical Africanists advocated the republic of Azania with the slogan “Africa for Africans” and an expulsion of white people; Steve Biko’s black consciousness, however, included Coloured and Indians in that notion of Africanness (Chipkin 2007: 8ff). Identity politics based on ethnicity were never at the core of African National Congress’ (ANC) ideology (Piombo 2009: 1). In its pledge to the Freedom Charter, the ANC, from the beginning, stood for a pragmatic view of South Africa belonging “to all who live in it” (ANC 2019). Nevertheless, ideological divergences and fractions within this political umbrella have been alive ever since. Eventually, the main binding factor was a distinct differentiation from the apartheid state and therefore “the African imagined community was inclusive of all races unlike the exclusive community of white minority” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 175). The corruption of ANC’s socialist ideas in favour of neoliberal concessions manifested during the negotiations in the mid 1990s (Bond 2004). Along with that, it was also an opportunity for de-radicalising and “panel-beating” different fractions and movements into a streamlined version of the new South Africa; the emergence of the Rainbow Nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 175). In hindsight, trading social ideals for momentary peace was not the worst imaginable deal in those tensed times.

1994 signified the need to unify under one embracing myth. The Rainbow Nation seemed the most suitable foundation, as it explicitly recognised difference. Archbishop Desmond Tutu is traditionally credited with coining the phrase; he spoke of South Africans as the “Rainbow People of God” in a number of television appearances (Baines 1998: 1).³ The Rainbow evokes the biblical story of Noah and the flood as “a sign of God’s oath never to wreak vengeance on

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³ According to Wesemüller (2005: 76), the first mentioning by Tutu took place during the anti-apartheid peace march in Cape Town on 13 September 1989.
humanity again” and the metaphor lends “a religious dimension to nationhood” (Evans 2010: 309). In some ways the religious connotation “bestowed divineness on South Africa’s ethnic diversity” (Gumede 2005: 242). Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, with reference to Benedict Anderson (1983), remark how this uniting transcendence is the prime function of a national myth and was applicable to 1994 South Africa when a national utopia made it possible “to surpass the finality of death and eradication [...] in periods of distinct social stress: when new developments within, or pressures from outside, undermine a sense of continuity” (2001: 140). Tutu used the Rainbow metaphor not as “a language of fact, but of faith” (Boraine 2000: 80). Instead of painting South Africa in an overly naïve and optimistic light, the Rainbow Nation rather asked of the society “to become what it is called to be. The image embodies a promise of what is possible in the future. It is the language of poetry” (Boraine 2000: 80). The religious undertone made the content somewhat non-negotiable and multivalent. The Rainbow Nation became an ultimately basal human ideal of oneness in multiplicity. Tutu’s use of the metaphor was strong because it did not try to undo or deny diversity but expressed “his belief in the ability of all South Africans to co-exist in spite of and because of difference” (Gqola 2001: 98). Exactly this transcendent universalistic root contained the limited success of the concept:

“The key to this national ontology of indigenerality lay in its ‘ecclesiastical abstraction from historicity’ and its status as a transcendent ‘third space’; [...] Sitas [2010: 27ff] reminds us that the erasures and repressions entailed in the production of this national ontology – its ‘restless dead’ – would continue to haunt it” (Hart 2014: 169).

Because the Rainbow People stood for mankind at large, it failed to interpellate South Africans in their particularities (Chipkin 2007: 183). South Africa’s far-reaching symbolic power as hope for humanity was at the time its inner stumbling block to a unified nation.

4 Salazar (2002: 24ff) elaborates how specifically the genre of poetry in South African speeches, especially in Mandela’s first SoNA (24 May 1994), made it possible to serve as a transition marker drafting and at the same time realising an agreeable utopia.
Nelson Mandela⁵ transformed the Rainbow from a religious to a political as well as from a local to a global symbol when he mentioned it for the first time in his inauguration speech in Pretoria in May 1994:

“We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a Rainbow Nation at peace with itself and the world” (Government of South Africa 1994).

This speech was outstanding in many aspects. It was Mandela’s rhetorical role “to perform the nation in a way that makes her appear to herself united yet diverse” (Salazar 2002: 31). Salazar calls the execution of this speech “in one gesture, in one voice” the enstatement and “birth” of South Africa which for the first time ever could claim legitimacy as a nation (Salazar 2002: 22). The adaptation of Tutu’s “Rainbow Nation of God” fitted in with ANC’s axiom of non-racialism (Myambo 2010: 94). It was a conscious distancing from apartheid primordial and purist nationalism “predicated on shared ‘blood’, culture and language” (Evans 2010: 309).

Mandela’s “own mythology became intertwined with that of the ‘new’ nation” (Evans 2010: 309). He personally became an embodiment of the new South Africa and worked towards representing multiculturalism.⁶

“The extraordinary circumstances, i.e., the need for nation-building, required a double role as a democratically elected and therefore politically mortal president and the projection of an individual role-model citizen who was able to personally reconcile with the suffered injustices and enact the vision of the new South Africa. [...] Hence, the main rhetorical characteristic of the founding years was the blurring between the private and the public sphere. [...] By emphasizing that he is an average South African, Mandela ennobled the population as a whole; praising Mandela

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⁵ Evans remarks that given the fact that Mandela’s public appearances were carefully staged by a team of speechwriters, such as Thabo Mbeki, Joel Netshitenzhe and Jakes Gerwel, it would be misleading to take the public figure and brand for the individual person (Evans 2010: 323f; see also Turner 2015: 261ff).

equalled praising South Africans” (Turner 2015: 161; see also Salazar 2002: 19 and 35).

The unification of office and person went as far as morphing Mandela into the strongest South African brand (Turner 2015: 261; see also Tomaselli and Shepperson 2009). His outstanding achievement as a rhetor laid less in his speech writing skills, nor in his performative qualities, but mainly in the moral content of Mandela’s words, the speaker’s ethos (Aristoteles 1999: I/2) and a timely delivery (Salazar 2002: 27). Palatability for the myth of the Rainbow Nation – which had not been naturally accepted by everyone – was also achieved by reverting to lexis and register from “well-trodden semantic paths” of “integration, capacity-building, intervention, partnership, and cooperation” (Salazar 2002: 25).

From the beginning, the Rainbow metaphor was aimed at nullifying ethnical fragmentation. Unlike in other African post-liberation countries, the discourse of ethnicity – understood in a narrow sense as a form of tribalism – was not made relevant but rather replaced by issues of race relations. It has been argued that this latency of ethnicity as a mobilising tool is rooted in the almost uncontested dominance of the centralised one-party government in South Africa,

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7 Mbeki has been to a large extent the author of Mandela’s public performances (Gevisser 2009: 246). He had been “indispensable” to Mandela “for his diplomatic and rhetorical skills” because he could “rustle up an eloquent speech so efficiently” (Gevisser 2009: 212). Mbeki not only wrote Mandela’s first SoNA in May 1994, but his handwriting has actually influenced the entire ANC rhetoric from the 1970s to 2009 (Turner 2015: 100).

8 Compared to its predecessors, the ANC introduced a completely innovative SoNA rhetoric. Mandela’s way of speaking was gentle and poetical. Shaped by his past as a lawyer, it was, however, not overtly graphical, but rather “gentlemanly” and “implicit”, i.e., it did “not aspire to present itself as an exercise in the mastery of public speaking” which would inevitably reclaim the superiority habitus of the old regime (Salazar 2002: 19). Mandela was known to be a slow speaker “famous for his wooden, painstaking delivery from a script” (Davis 2010: 13).

9 “Ethnicity refers to a form of social identity defined by ascriptive characteristics, such a race, language, tribe, caste, or religion. Ethnic groups are considered to have a common set of cultural traits that foster a sense of distinctiveness, even if these cultural traits are not unique to the ethnic group. Ethnicity is often conceptualized in distinction to other forms of social identity, such as class membership or associational identities, that are more situationally based and fluid” (Piombo 2009: 4).
which rendered its activation unrewarding with regards to winning further votes (Piombo 2009: 3).

In terms of implementation, propelled through the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (TRC) proceedings, the Rainbow Nation was hierarchically imposed as one strong hegemonic version of the nation:

“The TRC [...] as well as the myth of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ and its performative intention have served to discursively create a national identity that has been top-down in its constitution and implementation. As a result, true reconciliation has been foregone in place of a simplified and somewhat candy-coated myth of peace” (Valji 2003: n.p.).

After 1994, the currency of the Rainbow concept slowly faded as it naturalised in public discourse (Gqola 2004: 6). South Africans accepted their Rainbow identity and the term thus featured less and less in the public sphere. Rainbowism was seen as less progressive as time went on, and instead became “an authorising narrative which assisted in the denial of difference” (Gqola 2001: 99). While doubtlessly, the Rainbow Nation enabled the peaceful transition from apartheid, it did so at the expense of ignoring “grand ideological cleavages of class and race” (Sitas 2010: 38 in Hart 2014:170).

These forgotten categories were loudly re-evoked by the Fallists. While student protests have long been a regular feature at South African universities, in 2015, they caught nation-wide media attention (Langa 2017: 6). The official start of #FeesMustFall was reported on 14 October 2015 at the University of the Witwatersrand (Booysen 2016a: 5). This protest was preceded and followed by several other #-unrests, such as #RhodesMustFall in Cape Town a few months earlier that year. Fallists were a disparate collection of groups with different goals metamorphosing along the way (Booysen 2016a: 1). Initially, the focus of the largely peaceful protests was on the abolishment of colonial symbols in the university space. It then moved on to concrete demands of fee waving, and grew into a larger critique and more vehement forms of resistance against a neoliberal, racist and colonised university system (Langa 2017: 6). Temporarily, it also featured some extreme and worrisome radicalised and racialised views as well as violent outbreaks (Everatt 2016: 136).
With government’s concessions towards the demands, the momentum of the movement and its media attention temporally died down (Booysen 2016b: 37). Despite the ebbing off of the actions after the goal of fee abolishment had been partly achieved, fundamental grievances such as the decolonisation of the curriculum are still at stake and being redressed. It remains to be seen to what extent the deeper ideological demands for transformation will play a role in the public South African discourse after the 2019 elections.

The concerted outcry of students in particular can be deduced to shifts in the general economic situation of South Africa in the late 2010s. Fallism has largely been driven by black students who “aspire to move from the working class to the middle class” (Bond 2016: 205). While in the early post-apartheid days, degreed black students were needed for the transformation of the economic sector and state bureaucracy, from the beginning of the millennium on, jobs for graduates have become scarcer and state funding for bursaries has dwindled (Ndlovu 2017:48). Todays’ students are well aware that “a university degree is certainly not a guarantee of employment” (Bond 2016: 205).

Defining Fallism is one step towards an assessment of its impact on government and the wider South African society (Booysen 2016a: 2). Evidently, #FeesMustFall, unlike previous student protests, was no longer a concern bound to the realms of university campuses but one with wider social and political ramifications: “In 2015, students took their fight beyond university walls, to the national political sphere” (Ndlovu 2017: 1). The terminology for #FeesMustFall and its relatives ranges from “revolt,” over “uprising” to “movement” (Booysen 2016a: 1f). The latter term was preferred by Fallists “in relation to their multi-campus, cross-province and international action under the banner #FeesMustFall” (Booysen 2016a: 2). Perhaps it is appropriate to call #FeesMustFall a “political opening,” characterised as “a set of processes that modify [...] access to power” (Piombo 2009: 4). To be termed a true revolution, structural changes in government were too minor (Ndlovu 2017: 37). Nevertheless, Fallism brought about “deep probing of the value and validity of the transitional negotiations of the early 1990s” (Booysen 2016b: 3):

“#FeesMustFall [...] unleashed social and political power that challenged the established political order [...] and changed the
social fabric of universities and parts of society. [...] October 2015, in the main, changed universities, government’s relations with the youth, and government itself” (Booysen 2016b: 22f).

In concrete terms the changes related to “national fiscal planning” and university policies but more importantly, Fallists reminded government that “the 1994 settlement” was just a tender beginning and needed urgent evolution as the “socio-political compact was no longer carved in stone” (Booysen 2016b: 23). The impact on government was thus substantial and after the Zuma fail there was hope for a return to genuine ANC values with Ramaphosa’s presidency. Although “political order” was still in place in 2016, “there was no going back entirely to the status quo ante” (Booysen 2016a: 3). In “rising against the liberators” (Booysen 2016a: 10), Fallists thus marked in some ways the official end of the Rainbow Nation. For this reason, Ramaphosa could not afford to ignore the Fallists in his proclamation of the “New Dawn” (The Presidency 2018).

While the direct challenging of government is evident, it must still be made clear, to what extent students – as a small section of society – represent grievances of South Africans at large. In relating their demands to issues like decolonisation, land redistribution, persisting racism and social inequalities, the movement became “relevant for the larger South African society” (Bond 2016: 205). Fallism had tangible unification power for diverse student groups and the greater South African public, especially in the beginning phase of the movement, which later splintered and radicalised10 (Everatt 2016: 133ff).

The political centrality of education is another significant factor for South Africa at large. Much as the Soweto uprising took education as the key (Booysen 2016a: 16) to a “better life for all,” #FeesMustFall is relevant for the future of South Africa in its entirety. Economic and political developments in the new millennium sharpened this focus:

10 “By early 2016 [...] the movement faced the danger of replacing agency with a self-reinforcing victimhood in which ‘the African child’ was the hapless victim of whiteness. [...] The ‘enemy’ had shifted from an exploitative capitalist state, managed by the ANC [...] to ‘whiteness’ in all forms. [...] Some began discussing white genocide as a ‘rational choice’ [...] The movement, which had enjoyed substantial public sympathy and united students, increasingly offered racist tropes as it fragmented the broad-based support it had formerly enjoyed” (Everatt 2016: 136).
“Inflationary credentialism [...] intensified the chase for university access. The phenomenon was well established in South Africa by 2000 and society saw the requirement of qualifications, including university degrees, for appointment to even modest position. [...] In short, by 2016, not merely a middle-class job, but realistic chances of getting any job, depended on (but still did not ensure) obtaining a post-secondary qualification. This helps to explain the desperation for aspirant students to not be excluded because they cannot cope with the running costs of accommodation, food, transport and books” (Booysen 2016a: 16).

Furthermore, many hopes are laid upon the born-frees, i.e., people born after 1994, as breadwinners to economically free their families. In their self-understanding, Fallists saw themselves as the natural protector of society from a corrupt government and thus naturally had to distance themselves from “the tight emotional connection to Tutu’s and Mandela’s [...] ‘rainbow nation’” (Ndlovu 2017: 51).

Fallism also represents a generational shift (Ndlovu 2017: 48) of the voiced discontent by the born-frees with Mandela’s liberation myth, i.e., the Rainbow Nation, as well as with neoliberal paradigms “(be ‘good customers and pay for services’ or even ‘play by the rules of multiparty democracy and the constitution’)” (Booysen 2016b: 3f.). In the past, born-frees have been characterised as apolitical based, e.g., on dwindling voter turn-out or decreased volunteering in political organisations and parties (Ndlovu 2017: 120). This recess from politics11 was due to a frustration with state capture, corrupt political parties and cronyism, as well as a general fatigue with hollow struggle rhetorics and managerialism. While it might seem contradictory at first sight to label Fallists apolitical, there is a measurable decline in political civil engagement, a qualitative “thinning” of political participation as Ndlovu terms it, replaced by impulsive and expressive albeit distant forms of participation, e.g., through slacktivism on social media (2017: 18 and 122). Doubtlessly, though, #FeesMustFall

11 A general depolitisation of citizens can also be related to a strong neoliberal state who emphasises “managerialism (to deliver ‘human rights’), juridical expertise (to protect ‘human rights’) and education (to alter ‘xenophobic attitudes’) – in other words, that ‘technicism has replaced active politics” (Neocosmos 2010:115 in Hart 2014: 173. See also Turner 2015 and Mbembe 2014).
refreshed the historical image of politicised youth in South Africa that had been fading in the 2000s (Ndlovu 2017:18).

Although #FMF received much momentum through “thin” participation on social media, it remains debatable whether Fallism can be labelled a populist movement. Though focusing the demands in times of heated public media attention, students’ protests against ludicrous fees and structural injustices have had a long history in post-apartheid South Africa (e.g., Langa 2017: 7), and therefore Fallists did not buy into temporary favourable moods of society in order to gain support. Neither were their goals unrealistic and unobtainable but rather distinct and reasonably calculated (Bond 2016). By being consciously part of the social elite themselves (e.g., Ndlovu 2017: 48), and never seriously questioning this status, students’ solidarity with outsourced workers cannot be read as an active distancing from elites for populist gains but rather as resistance to neoliberal institutionalised structures. The same goes for the lack of evident anti-intellectual discourse typical for populist rhetorics; e.g., among EFF leaders. Furthermore, one cannot detect an ostensibly apolitical behaviour (e.g., charismatic, comedian, private public appearances etc.), as neither did the Fallists identify or stylise one particular leader as a personalised icon – which could have for instance easily been fostered through social media – nor did they for most part, seem disorganised and undisciplined – i.e., in a populist reading spontaneous and impulsive – but rather were clear and distinct in their agenda (Everatt 2016: 146). Also, Fallists did not argue on the basis of “common sense,” but drew on a rich intellectual history. While they were rightly arguing morally, they – at least initially – avoided polarising stances for instance on ethnicity. Their non-partisan standpoint was likely due to a fear of being highjacked by party interests, rather than a strategy to remain ideologically non-committing (see Booysen 2016b: 47).

12 Over time, #FMF focused on the discourse of decolonisation claiming radical social transformation with regards to nationalism, racism and exclusion (Booysen 2016a: 3). These demands were based on black consciousness, “African-nationalist and pro-black-African tenors” (Booysen 2016a: 3). Steve Biko’s writings were a leading intellectual beacon for the movement (Booysen 2016a: 13).

13 “The ideologies of feminism, the intersectionality of continuous societal injustice, black-African consciousness and identity, and dismissal of liberalism and neoliberalism were the core of the combination of more immediate targets for non-negotiables in the mix of targets for Fallism” (Booysen 2016a: 3).
In sum, one can observe that currently the direct impact of the movement for wider South African society remains limited and the Fallists did not formulate a greater vision for the nation or a “society-wide strategy for change” (Everatt 2016: 146). Nevertheless, questioning the status quo evoked a reaction by the authorities to these disruptions. Fallism can be methodologically compared to the Rainbow Nation when seeing it as a metaphor in its own right; as the representation of officially widespread formulation of the end of the Rainbow; as an “oath of allegiance that everything to do with oppression and conquest of black people by white power must fall and be destroyed” (Athabile Nonxuba 2016 in Booysen 2016a: 4). Although Fallists did not come up with a national masterplan for South African identity, they, however, distinctly replaced the ideological underpinnings of neoliberalism and rainbowism with pan-africanism, black-consciousness and African nationalism (Booysen 2016b: 30) and uncovered the implicit patriarchal, neoliberal and capitalistic costs (Ndlovu 2017: 28) that came with buying into the Rainbow Nation. Fallists represented the attitudinal change in the post-colonial state (Ndlovu 2017: 48). In that, they concertedly voiced the dissents that had been brewing in South Africa at large for quite a while and thus actively dismantled the Rainbow.

**Axing the Rainbow**

As several writers noted (e.g., Gqola 2004: 6; Gevisser 2009: 310), 14 2004 marked the end of the “halo-period” (Reid 2011: 362) and a shift in South African rhetoric history with Thabo Mbeki’s “dismantling” (Turner 2015: 186ff) and a tune-change of “public parlance” (Gqola 2004: 6). South Africa had started to move away from the emphasis on unity towards new ways of defining “South Africanness” (Gqola 2004: 6). Voices calling for a more representative counter myth grew louder (Reid 2011: 362).

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14 Hart anchors the moment of the great disillusionment a few years earlier with the Bredell land occupation in 2001, where the ANC government violently evicted people from occupied land and thus manoeuvred themselves into a “profound moral crisis” (Hart 2014: 2ff). The incident symbolically “dashed hopes of material improvement for many black South Africans” and resulted in waves of social protest movements such as the “Anti-Privatization Forum and the Landless Peoples’ Movement”: “Activists within and beyond the country heralded the movements as embodiments of counter-hegemonic globalization and transnational civil society fighting against the ravages of neoliberal capitalism” (Hart 2014: 2ff).
Rainbowism is critiqued for “the act of invoking the Rainbow Nation as a means of silencing dissenting voices on the state of the nation” (Gqola 2001: 99). Silencing of difference is the most prominent argument against the notion of the Rainbow Nation. The agents in silencing are promotors who benefit from a unifying rather than differentiating metaphor in various discursive contexts from political speeches, to advertisements, or the 2010 Soccer World Cup (Hart 2013: 171). Spoken Word artist Kgafela Oa Magogodi describes it as such:

“We are told that this is a country of miracles—the miracle of the birth of a Rainbow Nation. [...] People see things, they don’t talk about them, and they get rewarded for their silence. [...] The voices that are promoted are those that buy into this paradigm of a Rainbow Nation, which is really incarcerating [...]. You have to leave some things behind and be nice. That’s what the rainbow thing is about. It’s about making pleasant gestures” (cited in Slade 2015: 4).

The focus on aspects of multiculturalism “that are comfortable for a white minority” and a blurred view on “structural inequalities” among South African cultures results in rendering “people’s lived experiences” invalid (Gachago and Ngoasheng 2016). In contrast to the reality of the large majority of black South Africans, who had to forgive and forget while continuing to be grossly structurally and economically disadvantaged, most white South Africans had generally speaking fewer sacrifices to make to survive in the new dispensation (see also Mbembe 2014). Many kept their jobs, houses and mind sets from the older days and benefitted from the re-appropriation of South Africa in the global village. This perceived ideological and transformative imbalance, the “white intransigence” and “self-serving indifference to the ‘new’ South Africa” (Hart 2014: 170 referring to Sitas 2010) might be further reasons why the currency of the Rainbow Nation has dwindled over time. The dominant national myth stabilises and affirms the status quo of that section of society “which maintains political and social power” and the myth rhetorically naturalises and justifies this “position of privilege” (Reid 2011: 25f). While in post-apartheid South Africa, political power had been handed over to a black elite, economic and intellectual power, as well as property rights has still been a fortress of white dominance and hence – among other eminent reasons such as cronyism and corruption – the structures and fields
of power have up to today not been evenly reverted or redistributed. “Under current conditions, colour-blindness simply means ‘keeping blacks in their place.’ [...] Concentrated racial poverty can only be altered by directly confronting the white privileges that sustain them” (Mbembe 2014). In some respect, the Rainbow was not colour blind after all, since some had to pay a high price for the new South Africa while others – literally – got away with murder. In addition, critique of the status quo was sometimes labelled racist:

“Reactionary forces also mobilise the discourse of nonracialism to silence those who point to any trace of racism in the present, or call for some form of reparation for the injustices of the past” (Mbembe 2014).

Probably much like any other national myth, the Rainbow Nation is a form of illusion. The realisation that “unity in plurality” is not the same as equity and justice, is a bitter wake-up call:

“The promise of development has placed all citizens in an illusio. [...] state discourses of nation-building [such as development, poverty alleviation and democratic freedom], have created hopes and expectations of improbable utopias. [...] dynamics of this process maintain margins of society, in other words, the society stays heterogeneous in some way” (Kalpagam 2006: 97ff).

Rainbowism also feeds into the affirmation of a neoliberal ideology and materialism embraced by many black and white privileged born-free South Africans. This generation on the surface was trained to be oblivious to the categories of race, class and gender and has in some realms like school and the media been brought up to believe that “only the ‘human race’ exists” (Gachago and Ngoasheng 2016). This ideal notion of equality comes with the neoliberal assumption that anyone can “succeed if they just work hard enough” (Gachago and Ngoasheng 2016). While the colour-blindness is in large aspects welcome, it also downplays grossly unequal starting points and growth conditions in which young South Africans strive to assert themselves. Many youth “from the rainbowism school of thought struggle with the sensitive issue of acknowledging their privileged backgrounds” (Gachago and

15 “All nationalisms are therefore appropriative, since they all claim unisonance, and since these claims necessarily involve speaking for – and therefore silencing – others” (Lazarus 1999: 109).
Ngoasheng 2016). This strengthens a neoliberal ideology in which the dutiful, upright and hard-working inevitably are going to succeed. The Fallists have formulated this discrepancy and brought it back into current public discourse. The Rainbow, as a symbol for plurality and political freedom, does not per se bring about economic freedom:

“Belonging to the rainbow implies that the members of the rainbow have equal access to the mythic pot of gold, wealth. [...] Here rainbowism seems to work to demonstrate the manner in which all South Africans have equal access to resources. The falsity of that claim is self-evident. [...] The rainbow is the prosperity after the rain, the reward flowing from the discord. It suggests that the struggle is over and little work remains to be done” (Gqola 2001: 100).

In sum, the Rainbow Nation has been a suitable concept to both display as well as fade out and blur social, cultural and political differences of South Africans at a time when civil war was tangibly in the air. The ongoing coating of differences, in the long run, however, also rhetorically affirmed existing structural inequalities by not addressing them:

“The metaphor of the rainbow people is hailed as a celebration of unity and the successes of a post-apartheid dispensation. Yet its benefits continue to elude, slip and mock. It rejects transparency and its constitutive meanings constantly undercut each other. It foregrounds difference at precisely the moment during which it trivialises its implications. Thus, an interrogation of its connotations yields no definitive answers. It simultaneously leads everywhere and nowhere, is helpful and dangerous because even as it asserts its presence, it signifies absence” (Gqola 2001: 100).

Silencing difference has never been the intention of the inventors of the metaphor (Evans 2013: 323). While the Rainbow had been a suitable concept at its time of inception, it grew dated when stumbling transformation and regression became evident. As with any metaphor, there is a currency peak and subsequent capital loss as soon as an image fades in power to stir the imagination but has rather become naturalised into language (Turner 2015: 74). Since one of the typical characteristics of national myths is its polyvalence, its
interpretation and performative power are highly context dependent (Hall 1993: 355). In post-apartheid government rhetoric, however, the text promised change but the context remained the same.

The prime site where the power of a national myth is negotiated is the State of the Nation Address (Turner 2015: 13). The following section examines Cyril Ramaphosa’s version of the South African soul and fibre and explores to what extent it adheres to the criticisms voiced by the Fallism movement.

**Ramaphosa’s Version of the Nation**

This section applies Critical Discourse Analysis to a central political text (Bhatia 2006; Reisigl 2006) contextualised in the previous sections, namely the State of the Nation Address by Cyril Ramaphosa, in order to make evident the role and meaning of traded and potentially renewed metaphors and narratives that drive and steer nation-building.

On 16 February 2018, one day after his inauguration, the newly elected president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, held his maiden State of the Nation Address to parliament. In this speech, he foregrounded the topics of economic growth, tourism, slimming down the cabinet, and youth employment.

Ramaphosa started out vaguely thanking former president Jacob Zuma, who decided in the last minute not to attend the speech (Kubheka 2018), for his achievements and “significant progress in several areas of development” (The Presidency 2018). When Zuma was mentioned, the audience reacted with booing (Citizen Reporter 2018). Loud applause was, however, granted (Citizen Reporter 2018), when Ramaphosa introduced the overall frame of his speech − Mandela’s legacy on the occasion of his 100th anniversary:

“We will recount Madiba’s long walk to freedom, his wisdom, his unfailing humility, his abiding compassion and his essential integrity. [...] Guided by his example, we will use this year to reinforce our commitment to ethical behaviour and ethical leadership. [...] We are continuing the long walk he began, to build a society in which all may be free, [...] in which all may share in the wealth of our land and have a better life. [...] We should
honour Madiba by putting behind us the era of discord, disunity and disillusionment” (The Presidency 2018) [emphasis by the present author].

In reference to “a better life” promised by Mandela and Mbeki (Turner 2015: 247ff), Ramaphosa adjuncts to the pre-Zuma post-apartheid rhetoric and thus implicitly affirms the notion of the Rainbow Nation. The emphasis on ethical integrity was clearly directed at Zuma who had caused havoc for the reputation and credibility of South Africa due to his involvement in state capture and other scandals (Renwick 2018). By rhetorically linking to Mandela and Mbeki, Ramaphosa by default “deletes” the Zuma years. Also in terms of a neoliberal outlook on development, Ramaphosa connects with the legacy of Mandela and Mbeki (Turner 2015):

“We are building a country where a person’s prospects are determined by their own initiative and hard work and not by the colour of their skin, place of birth, gender, language or income of their parents” (The Presidency 2018).

This reaffirms a “colour-blind” (Mbembe 2014) and context-free approach to material improvement. From a pragmatic point of view, Ramaphosa makes an interesting move here by “repeating this point exactly in Afrikaans” (Whittles and Pather 2018), thus explicitly including whites and the former oppressors in his new vision of South Africa; a point that had been recently questioned in public discourse by some more extremist voices (Huffington Post South Africa 2018). It seems that heated and increasingly ethnocentric discourses outside the mainstream in contemporary South Africa necessitated this heavily symbolic gesture.

Rhetorically, Ramaphosa reactivated the notion of the “New Dawn” as the motto of his speech, symbolising hope and renewal. This was, however, no new invention, but a recycled motto from Thabo Mbeki

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16 “South Africa is the most income-unequal of any major country, and ‘tokenistic’ grant payments […] for most beneficiaries, ‘free basic services’ and an unfunded national health insurance make little difference, and sometimes (as in water provision) have had the opposite effect because of Pretoria’s social policy neoliberalism” (Bond 2016: 204).
in 2004\textsuperscript{17} (Turner 2015: 187). By emphasising the “arrival of a new dawn” with his inauguration, he uses the phrase in a way that one is inclined to read Ramaphosa himself as the personification of this new era of hope.

Ramaphosa aligned with liberal ANC traditions against racialised discourses that become increasingly louder in contemporary South Africa:

“As we rid our minds of all negativity, we should reaffirm our belief that South Africa belongs to all who live in it. For though we are a diverse people, we are one nation. There are 57 million of us, each with different histories, languages, cultures, experiences, views and interests. Yet we are bound together by a common destiny” (The Presidency 2018) [emphasis by the present author].

This section is noteworthy for the conception of South Africanness. Intriguingly, Ramaphosa adds a line at this very point in the speech which had not been in the manuscript saying: “defined by a common destiny that is defined by our South Africanness” (SABC News 2018: 00:13:51). For Ramaphosa, the momentary unity of South Africans lies in the common interest to overcome the Zuma administration and the damages it has done. Side blows to Zuma were placed diplomatically vague but yet sufficiently straightforward for most to notice the reference to the former president:

“We are determined to build a society defined by decency and integrity that does not tolerate the plunder of public resources, nor the theft by corporate criminals of the hard-earned savings of ordinary people. While there are many issues on which we may differ, on these fundamental matters, we are at one” (The Presidency 2018) [emphasis by the present author].

\textsuperscript{17} On 6 February 2004, in his 6\textsuperscript{th} State of the Nation Address, Thabo Mbeki in commemorating 10 years of democracy, remembered the first democratic elections in a typically literary manner: “For the black […] majority, suddenly a new dawn broke. After these masses had cast their votes, they still had nothing in their stomachs and their pockets. […]. But yet they had a spring in their step because they knew that a new dawn had proclaimed the coming of a bright day” (cited in Turner 2015: 187).
South Africanness is further historically anchored by a subtle and non-antagonising acknowledgement of Africanist concerns when referring to the forefathers of a black version of South Africa:

“For this, we owe much to our forbearers – people like Pixley ka Seme, Charlotte Maxeke and Chief Albert Luthuli – who understood the necessity of the unity and harmony of all the people of this great land. We are a nation at one” (The Presidency 2018) [emphasis by the present author].

Especially the reference to ka Seme invokes early black ideas of South Africa. On 8 January 1912, ka Seme emphasised in his speech on the formation of the forerunner of the ANC, the SANNC, the need for African unity as a reaction to the white exclusionary idea of South Africa:

“Gentlemen of our race, [...] The white people of this country have formed what is known as the Union of South Africa – a union in which we have no voice [...] We have therefore called you to this Conference [to form] our national union for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges” (in Odendaal 1984: 273).

In some sections, Ramaphosa’s subtle acknowledgement of the Rainbow critique can be observed but is not taken any further:

“We know that there is still a lot that divides us. We remain a highly unequal society, in which poverty and prosperity are still defined by race and gender. [...] Poverty levels rose in 2015, unemployment has gone up and inequality has persisted. For several years our economy has not grown at the pace needed to create enough jobs or lift our people out of poverty. (The Presidency 2018) [emphasis by the present author].

The focus on youth in this speech may also have been a reaction to the unrests at universities in the past couple of years. However, Ramaphosa initially avoids speaking of students and includes all youth:

“I will therefore be establishing a Youth Working Group that is representative of all young South Africans to ensure that our
policies and programmes advance their interests” (The Presidency 2018).

In absorbing protesting students and their explicit criticism into the larger group of youth and by framing them as being “taken care of,” Ramaphosa in effect silences the criticisms as it appears that they are seen to. “Expulsion in the form of containment” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 33f) is a popular rhetoric instrument. In applying rhetorical strategies of paternalising and infantilising claims of protesting students, government absorbs the disrupting powers of the protests in order to maintain dominating topoi of South African national identity such as national unity, social cohesion and the Rainbow Nation.19

Later in the speech, the new president committed to the rather symbolical promise of former president Zuma to abolish study fees for the so-called “missing middle”:

“On 16 December last year, former President Jacob Zuma announced that government would be phasing in fully subsidised free higher education and training for poor and working class South Africans over a five-year period. Starting this year, free higher education and training will be available to first year students from households with a gross combined annual income of up to R350,000” (The Presidency 2018).20

18 In reporting on the Fallism movement, the South African media repeatedly (e.g., Malingo 2016, Jamal 2016) portrayed students as “being cared for” by state and university management. This had a paternalising and muting effect, as dissent with putative compromises, e.g., a stop of fees increase for the “missing middle,” then seemed “obstinate” (e.g., Gwangwa 26.10.2016). Then-education minister Blade Nzimande framed the students as children under his care: “To subsidise these students would require taking funding from the poor to support cheaper higher education for the wealthy […]. We cannot subsidise the child of a cleaner or unemployed person in the same way we subsidise the child of an advocate” (News24 2016).
19 “When its ‘children’ revolted and forced accountability and policy change on higher education, the ANC struggled for a while to find its feet again – but in order to be seen as remaining in charge, and in good standing with the rising youth generation, it conceded” (Boysen 2016b: 37).
20 Ramaphosa himself admitted in October 2015 that “higher levels of funding and the expansion of the capacity of the higher education system will be needed in future to ensure that higher levels of participation of African and coloured students are achieved” (Bond 2016: 198).
In line with South African SoNA tradition (Turner 2015: 58ff), Ramaphosa closed his speech in the peroratio with a reference to a national hero, in this case the recently deceased musician Hugh Masekhela. “In his song, ‘Thuma Mina’, he anticipated a day of renewal, of new beginnings.”

In essence, the apparent parallel of Mandela’s maiden SoNA speech (Turner 2015: 136ff), to Ramaphosa’s, is a time of social and political unrest that calls for stabilising coherence. Both presidents had to symbolise the overcoming of a difficult political period. While Mandela inherited the legacy of apartheid, Ramaphosa must instil confidence in his ability to redeem the Zuma years. From a rhetorical perspective, both employed a “reconciliatory tone” (Citizen 17.02.2018). But while Mandela invented South Africa anew with the Rainbow Nation (Turner 2015: 159ff; Salazar 2002: 22ff.), Ramaphosa chose to emphasise historical consistency by aligning with Mandela and Mbeki in the way they painted the nation in metaphorical images. A new metaphor that describes the current South Africa or future utopian visions, as called for by the Fallists, for instance, is yet to be found.

After the Rainbow

A rainbow can come after a rainy storm, a “new dawn,” after a dark night, a sleepy period with some nightmares. As much as the night might be apt for the Zuma years, as a vaguely recycled ANC motto, a “new dawn” is not strong enough to serve as an innovative teleological myth. Ramaphosa did not reinvent nor replace the Rainbow Nation in his first SoNA. Instead of addressing criticisms to national conceptions, e.g., by Fallists, he chose to silence these objections through absorption. His current agenda is strongly aligned with old rhetoric traditions of the post-apartheid era, which implicitly holds onto the idea of the Rainbow Nation. Since calling Mandela a “sell out” is currently en vogue, especially among the youth (BBC

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21 The slogan “lend a hand” that Ramaphosa is evoking here by citing Hugh Masekhela is an intertextual reference to a former SoNA motto: “The launch of the African Union had been an important point in Mbeki’s tenure and – together with the 25th anniversary of Steve Biko’s assassination – served as the historic anchoring of the 2002 SoNA (§10; §18). The motto, ‘lending a hand’ (§49) as a direct appeal, underlined the role of the individual citizen’s self-responsibility in building a nation” (Turner 2015: 179).
News 17.07.2018), this insistence on the Rainbow Nation ideology may be a dangerous move in the long run. Ramaphosa did not connect or refer to the Fallists’ ideological claims of decolonisation, who can be seen as the spearhead and mouthpiece in the call for political and social change. Although the new government’s foremost priorities are the restitution of land without compensation (Marrian and Mvumvu 2018), which has been a highly loaded symbol for a persisting colonisation and apartheid legacy, Ramaphosa missed out on his chances to personify the current call for a more brave intervention and transformation. Thanked by the international rating agencies (Head 2018), this may impose on his popularity among the majority of the South African population. The speech once more reiterated that the ANC is without vision and intellectually dead (Mbembe 2014).

On a positive note, the absence of the explicit mentioning of the Rainbow Nation metaphor “in public parlance” (Gqola 2004: 6) and its naturalisation into public consciousness might symbolise that the project of overcoming the apartheid myth has in some dimensions come to a conclusion (Slade 2015: 19): “It is possible that at the precise moment we perceived ourselves as achieving ‘Rainbow Nation’ status, its assertion became redundant” (Gqola 2004: 6). In a dialectical manner, the multiracial society developed as a response to the apartheid ideology and today, opposing this idea of the Rainbow, may stand for an era in which apartheid ideas of separate development and parallel worlds have long since gone (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 175).

A deconstruction of the Rainbow Nation may lay open and retain its pluralistic core while doing away with its “candy-coating” (Valji 2003: n.p.) tendencies. An exhaustion of a national myth requires a counter-myth, which is ideologically distinctly different (Reid 2011: 331); e.g., an Africanist reading of the South African nation. This must, however, neither be mistaken as the abolishment of the nation state nor the multicultural society per se: “The state is a minimal abstract structure which we must protect because it is our ally. It should be the instrument of redistribution” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 97f).

Nevertheless, it is quite questionable how a more radicalised vision of the nation should look like if not based on multiracial society. Generally speaking, a radical utopia is not necessarily the same as a realistic vision: “we need false pictures of the future in order to
mobilize radical strikes and that’s right we don’t want those to be realized” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 120). In the South African case, the state embodied by the Zuma administration had been “captured” (Renwick 2018) and raped, while the discourse of the nation had remained unaltered. However, for a cohesive society, there is a need to establish a convincing counter myth after the Rainbow Nation (Reid 2011:81). In the post-Zuma era, a strengthening of the state and a new unifying vision for the nation are both required; otherwise, radical splinter voices will become stronger. The ongoing “ubiquity of race” in South African discourses and physical realities “cannot be easily solved by professed commitments to non-racialism” alone, which does not sufficiently answer the question about the authentic identity of the national subject (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 177).

In many regards, one can see the university as a micro-cosmos of the nation, a system where Fallists feel and are alienated from (see e.g., Ndelu 2017: 63). One could say that a Fallist is “contained and dispossessed in the very territory from which one both departs and arrives” (Butler and Spivak 2007:18):

“The protests revealed that the bubble of an equal society had burst. The past and present were placed right next to each other and there was an intruding reality that they were the same. Not much had changed. South African rainbowism [...] has been fashioned with the idea that all are alike and will soon be equal. [...] The view of many protesting students, however, was that material conditions in South African society entrenched inequality. The assumption that democracy brought with it fairness and equal access was questioned” (Godsell et al. 2016: 118).

Though members of an elite, the Fallists are symbolic for the greater South African society in that regard. The call for decolonisation of the university space is similarly applicable to the South African private sector and large parts of civil society. Fallists are – rhetorically speaking – the driving mouthpiece in a dialectically moving transformation process which holds up a “deforming” language as its sharpest weapon:

“There can be no radical politics of change without performative contradiction. To exercise a freedom and to assert an equality precisely in reaction to an authority that would preclude both is
to show how freedom and equality can and must move beyond their positive articulations. The contradiction must be relied upon, exposed, and worked on to move towards something new. [...] This also involves a deformation of dominant language, and reworking of power, since those who sing are without entitlement. [...] We have to understand the public exercise as enacting the freedom it posits, and positing what is not yet there” (Butler and Spivak 2007: 67f).

Perhaps a suitable vision after the Rainbow downplays the race question in favour of a social question. There is a need for a strong new metaphor that does not focus on colour/race or ethnicity but rather on social inequality.

References


